Another flaw in monotonicity
schulze at sol.physik.tu-berlin.de
Sat Nov 14 07:49:10 PST 1998
you wrote [05 Nov 1998]:
> This is essentially the same problem as NOSHOW. Basically, the idea
> is that it is possible in the ranked methods that a vote can cause
> someone you rated higher lose to someone you rated lower, to the
> extent of defeating your first choice or electing your last choice.
> All of the ranked methods people are proposing (except Borda) have
> one or the other of the aforementioned problems, and Schulze,
> Smith//Condorcet and LCM (my method) have both.
It seems to me, that you are very pessimistic about the possibility,
that an election method can simultaneously meet the "Local
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion" and the
"Positive Involvement Criterion" resp. the "No-Show Criterion"
["Positive Involvement; No-Show," 16 Jun 1998].
Is it possible to prove, that the "Local Independence from Irrelevant
Alternatives Criterion" and the "Positive Involvement Criterion" are
incompatible? Is it possible to prove, that the "Local Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion" and the "No-Show Criterion"
I also want to ask: If you believe, that Schulze, Smith//Condorcet,
and LCM violate the "Positive Involvement Criterion" and the
"No-Show Criterion" similarly (and as I have already proven, that
Tideman violates the "Positive Involvement Criterion" and the
"No-Show Criterion" ["Re: Near Clone Sets", 10 Jun 1998]) and as you
don't think, that the "Generalized Majority Criterion" is important,
then why do you propagate LCM? Wouldn't it be better for you to
propagate Tideman? His method is well known and very easy to
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