First Choice Criterion

Blake Cretney bcretney at
Thu Nov 5 08:10:56 PST 1998

On Wed, 4 Nov 1998 18:10:57    Mike Ositoff wrote:
>> It should never be necessary to vote a less-liked alternative equal
>> to or over one's favorite in order to ensure the sincere CW wins.
>> But what's missing is the "necessary for WHO" part.  That is, who
>> has to be co-operating to ensure the CW win.  For example, "all
>> voters" or "any majority of voters".
>As I was saying in another reply, I meant that _no one_ should
>have to do that. But I think I know what you're getting at:
>With Margins, in a 3 candidate race, if the middle voters
>are willing to reverse their lower choices, then no one will
>have to vote anything less-liked over their favorite.
>Maybe that criterion's wording is lacking, then. Mayve
>the majority wording I discussed would be better.
>But unless the middle voters somehow know from which direction
>the order-reversal will be attempted (an offensive strategy
>involving reversal of a preference ordering is what can
>make Margins fail that criterion), then they can't do anything
>to prevent it. By deterring one side, they make it really easy
>for the other side. For that reason, I don't believe Middle's
>defensive strategy in Margins, against order-reversal can
>be said to protect the CW, since it royally sets the CW up
>for defeat by order-reversal. Therefore, the only way to
>really protect the CW is for at least 1 of the extreme sides
>to vote the CW over their favorite.
>So maybe that criterion is useful as written.

I don't think what you're describing can be written as a criterion.  A
criterion is a PASS/FAIL test that can be mathematically proven for
any method.  You don't think people will use order reversal in VA,
because of your retaliatory truncation strategy.  This may or may
not be true, but it certainly can't be mathematically proven.



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