New sw method: "extreme scale"

[Steve Eppley]

Mike S wrote:
>Steve E wrote:
>>Mike has confused the properties of the voting method with the
>>properties of the set of choices the group places on the ballot.
>>
>>There are really only relative preferences; popular constructs like
>>"absolute opposition" are mythical.  (Essentially journalistic
>>shorthands.) 
> 
> Steve is clearly a relativist - however he seems to insist that
> everybody else think the same way that he does.

Show us an example of absolute support or opposition.
 
> What about a parliamentary situation where there is a proposal "We
> should do XXX.: vote support or opposed." ?  Any vote to support or
> oppose is meaningful, but what is it relative to?

It's relative to "we should not do XXX."  

Care to try again?

>>What's important is to make sure all the
>>vital alternatives are choices on the ballot, so all the vital
>>relative preferences can be voted. 
> ...
>>If none of those 
>>special choices is on the ballot, then it's because the group
>>disagreed with Mike about the importance of being able to express
>>what he thinks is vital.  In other words, it's not a limitation of
>>the ballot method which would prevent voters from expressing what
>>Mike thinks is vital; it would be a decision by the group that those
>>expressions are *not* vital and that those special alternatives are
>>not acceptible outcomes.
> 
> One of my disagreements with ranked ballots is the combination of:
> a) The vital importance of including *all* relevant alternatives on
> the ballot (which may take potentially unlimited time - another
> problem) 

Not so.  A group's rules can specify vital default choices, such as
"do nothing" and "continue searching for better alternatives."

And there's no reason that a decision to pass X can't be made, then 
later undone by keeping the poll open, appending a choice Y, and 
voting Y more preferred than X and much more preferred than the 
supermajority-privileged "do nothing."

> and b) The ambiguity as to the exact method used to generate 
> the ballot.
> 
> For example, in another list Steve suggested a Condorcet ballot
> where every person could include every alternative desired onto the
> ballot.  Yet just now he implies that the group might choose *not*
> to include certain alternatives. How, pray tell, would *that* group
> decision take place?

It's called "rules", which can be passed by something called "voting."

It's not something which would happen often; I think most people 
would vote *not* to disallow any meaningful choices.

The context of this question was whether a ballot for the election 
to public office should or shouldn't include a "none of the above"
choice.  Some would argue that a public office must not be allowed 
to remain vacant.  Disallowing of certain choices is not something a
group would do often.  Mike's just blowing smoke; it's not a problem 
with ranked ballots.

> It appears that every "ballot method" requires either
> dictatorial/unilateral decisions to decide what gets listed on the
> ballot,  and/or requires some underpinning parliamentary procedure
> to make other decisions of the nature "Should we include XXX on the
> ballot?" or other questions.

No.  A group's rules could allow any member to append any choice to
the ballot, if the group wishes.  No dictator, no need to check with 
parliamentary procedure (until and unless the group makes a decision 
to exclude some choice).

> My research has led me to conclude that standard parliamentary
> procedure (e.g. Robert's Rules) with amendments and majority rule
> is flawed.  So even the ideal ballot method would have a flawed
> underpinning.

Who's talking about Robert's Rules and amendments?  Who's insisting
that *no* alternatives should have supermajority-privilege?

> The new FAQ rules are an attempt to design a more sensible
> parliamentary procedure.  

Close, but no cigar.

> I also suspect it can be used as is for the "choose one of N"
> ballot problem - just by having multiple independent proposals
> (with either simultaneous, overlapping, or distinct voting
> periods).  I do not believe that getting the timing right is
> crucial for obtaining a good result. 

See the recent example re: the vote in priorities at deliberate.com on
picking the name "constitution" or "bylaws-theory" for a new
maillist.  The order of the proposals turned out to make a
difference.  The less-preferred choice, which passed first 
because it was proposed first, survived only because of the 
irrational 3:1 privilege it gained by passing.

In general, granting a supermajority privilege to any proposal 
which passes clearly will affect the results, so there's a timing
dependency. 

Mike may subjectively and tautologically call all results "good",
but his rules violate this important axiom:  All else being equal,
it's better for a majority to rule than for a minority to rule. 

I'd be interested in hearing whether there's anyone besides Mike in
priorities at deliberate.com who thinks it's a rational paradigm.
I've never seen anyone other than Mike endorse it.

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)