MOAV "criterion"? (was RE: Truncation Resistance #2 criterion)

[Steve Eppley]

Demorep wrote:
>Mr. Eppley wrote--
>>Here's a little test case for MOAV:
>>   33: A
>>   33: B
>>   34: C
>
>The obvious MOAV answer-- since no candidate gets a majority, there
>is no winner.  The legislative body can fill the vacancy (as I have
>mentioned numerous times). 

Yes, we've heard the "President Gingrich" scenario before.  Some of 
us would like to accomplish single-winner reform asap, however, and 
not wait until the legislature is elected by a prop rep method and 
other Demorep-proposed constitutional amendments are enacted.

Demorep has also written that Approval and Instant Runoff satisfy his
fuzzy "MOAV" standard.  (I'll leave aside whether Approval satisfies
it, since this depends on which Approval method is being advocated.) 
I don't see how Demorep can possibly claim that IRO satisfies MOAV,
since it will elect C in the above test case. 

Here's another test case for MOAV (and IRO): 
   35: A 
   32: B 
   33: CB 
There aren't very many true statements which include the word
"majority" which can be made about the voters' preferences in this
example.  Here's the only one I see:  
   "A majority ranked B ahead of A."  
For someone like Demorep who obviously cares about majority rule, 
I think he's making a large logical mistake claiming that IRO satisfies 
MOAV, or any other "majority rule" criterion.

Demorep, how about posting a *clear* definition of MOAV so we can
rigorously determine whether a proposed voting method satisfies it
and whether constitutional amendment is needed before any method can 
satisfy it? 

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)