Condorcet Potential Results

Thu Feb 6 00:46:32 PST 1997

The plain Condorcet method by itself has the following obvious potential
In the method, a voter ranks his choices 1, 2, 3, etc.  Each pair of
candidates has the votes that rank each other over the other compared.
In the below examples the votes of voters who vote the same way are combined.

A.  A winner without a majority of all voters winners due to truncated votes
(not making all choices possible).


40 A
35 B
19 C
6  CB 
B wins using plain Condorcet by beating A, 41 to 40 and by beating C 35 to

B.  Being elected based on votes that do not find the candidate to be

The Condorcet ranking system only shows relative support (so-called *lesser
of two evils* ) and not whether or not the candidate is acceptable to the
voter. Obviously many voters find many candidates to be unacceptable.
In the below example the votes to the right of the slash (/) symbol are votes
in which the voters find the candidate to be unacceptable.

49 D/FE
48 E/FD
1   F/D
1   F/E
F wins using plain Condorcet by beating D 50 to 49 and by beating E 51 to 48.
  A mere 97 of 99 voters find F to be unacceptable.

C. Circular ties

35 AB
34 BC
31 CA

A 66 > B 34
B 69 > C  31
C 65 > A 35
or A > B > C > A -- a circular tie
With the Ossipoff tie breaker of fewest votes against in the worst defeat of
each candidate, the winner is C with a mere 65 of 100 votes against the

With 4 or more candidates each winner can of course be elected with fewer
votes using plain Condorcet with the Ossipoff tie breaker.

How many U.S. voters want such a method with such potential results ?  How
many U.S. voters want a potential U.S. civil war with such method that will
make the recent 2 months of marching in the streets in Serbia over stolen
elections look like child's play ?

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