Attachment CRITTBL1
Bruce Anderson
landerso at ida.org
Tue May 28 20:59:49 PDT 1996
On May 27, 5:00pm, Steve Eppley wrote:
> Subject: Re: Attachment CRITTBL1
> Bruce, you've provided a table of some ranked ballot voting methods
> which meet or fail to meet 7 criteria. Quite a few of the methods
> meet all 7 criteria, including Smith//Condorcet.
>
> You've also written that you prefer Regular-Champion to
> Smith//Condorcet, but I don't recall you explaining why.
>
> Since we're probably going to poll ourselves soon on methods, I'd
> like to hear your reasoning; otherwise I feel compelled based on
> the discussion so far to rank Smith//Condorcet higher than
> Regular-Champion.
>
> I presume that you're planning to post definitions of the methods
> mentioned in the table. I'm looking forward to that, because many of
> the methods' names are unfamiliar to me and because I'm curious about
> how Condorcet is defined (and by whom).
>
> ---Steve (Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)
>
>-- End of excerpt from Steve Eppley
As I implied in my other post tonight, I'm going about as fast as I can, even
though this must seem like a slow crawl to you and, perhaps, like standing still
to others. Yes, I should do all of the above. No, I won't be able to do very
much of it in the near future. Accordingly, I certainly understand if you feel
you cannot wait for me to find time to adequately answer the very reasonable
questions you pose above. Very quick outlines of these answers are as follows.
First, concerning voting methods, quick-and-very-rough outlines of definitions
are:
Anderson is least pairwise losses with ties broken by most pairwise wins -- I am
indebted to Mike for this simplification of my original more complex definition.
Anderson reduces to Copeland when there are no pairwise ties.
Arrow-Raynaud is sequential deletion by the minimum row maximum of r(i,j,1/2).
I can't continue now, I'll try to continue later this week. Sorry.
Bruce
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