Condorcet(x( ))

[Lucien Saumur]

In an article, seppley at alumni.caltech.edu ("Steve Eppley") writes:

>Lucien wrote:
>[snip]
>>          This winter, I have modified my computer voting
>>and tallying system to incorporate two features:
>[snip]
>>          When tallying the ballots, the program adds half
>>a vote to each candidate of the tied pairs.
>[snip]
>
>That's not Condorcet's method according to Mike Ossipoff's proposal,
>and based on the discussion in EM in recent days I think he's right
>not to tally .5 against each of the tied pairs.  
>
          I have difficulty identifying what constitutes
"the Condorcet method" beyond ranking the candidates and
performing a pairwise comparison of the results. I am aware
that Condorcet imagined the possibility of circular ties
but I am not aware that he has proposed a solution. Nor am
I aware that he has imagined equal ranking and truncated
voting much less am I aware how he proposed to deal with
these ballot refinements.

>You may or may not have implemented Condorcet(.5), depending on how
>you resolve circular ties.  How do you calculate the size of each
>candidate's worst defeat?  By "margin of difference" (not Condorcet)
>or by "votes for the pairwinner" (Condorcet)?
>
          As I have said before, I am not sure what to make
of circular ties. My feel is that they represent a weak
preference on the part of the voters so that the voters
would not be adverse to drawing lots to determine the
winner. But I could be wrong which is why that I think that
we need practical experience on this matter but I think
that to use the size of the worst defeat is an artificial
way to determine the winner.

>Would you consider implementing Condorcet(0), where nothing is
>tallied against the tied pairs, in your webpage? 

          My system could be changed in this way but I do
not see why this would be necessary.

          I do not understand why we have so much problem
with truncated ballots. I think that a truncated ballot may
not be interpreted otherwise than to mean that the voter
has no preference between the unranked candidates and that
no preference logically means equal preference. My system
lets a voter truncate the whole ballot which is to show no
preference for any of the candidates. Because my system
also lets the voters indicate whether some or all of the
candidates are unacceptable independently of the ranking, a
completely truncated ballot is not the same as a failure to
vote because a truncated ballot may affect the result of
the election by serving to declare that a winning candidate
is unacceptable or else by preventing that a winning
candidate be declared unacceptable.

__________________________________________
          aa447 at FreeNet.Carleton.CA
          http://www.igs.net/~lsaumur/