Insincere Minority Votes

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Mon May 27 22:29:21 PDT 1996


Any ranking method has a major problem with insincere minority votes when
there is a divided sincere majority.

Namely, in partisan marginal cases, an insincere minority can change the
winner if the sincere majority cannot by itself internally determine its
choice.

Examples- In each case (1) A and B are allied choices (or subgroups) in an
overall majority and (2) Z can be a single minority choice (or combined
minority choices). The range of votes using second choices show the
possibilities assuming the A and B voters in the majority would never choose
Z in the minority as a second choice.

1. Bare Majority Extreme Split-Large Minority
First Choices-- A 49, B 2, Z 50, Total 101
A 49 to 51
Z 50  Either A or Z wins
---
B  2 to 51
Z   50  Either B or Z wins
---
A 49 to 99
B 2 to 52   Either A or B wins

2. Bare Majority Equal Split- Large Minority
First Choices-- A 26, B 25, Z 50, Total 101
A  26 to 51
Z  50   Either A or Z wins
---
B  25 to 51
Z  50    Either B or Z wins
---
A  26 to 76
B  25 to 75  Either A or B wins

3. Large Divided Majority- Small Minority
First Choices-- A 50, B 49, Z 2, Total 101
A 50 to 99   A wins always
Z 2
---
B 49 to 99  B wins always
Z  2
---
A 50 to 52
B 49 to 51  Either A or B wins

In each either/or case, there can be ties, of course.

An obvious method for the majority to defeat the minority is to have a
disapproval vote (i.e. A and B combined would always defeat Z).

A question is whether the majority candidates should have the option to
receive minority second (or later) choices.

A second partial remedy in tie breaker situations when there are two or more
minority candidates (i.e. a divided minority) is to combine the earliest
choices of the voters whose first choices are among the candidates who would
survive a majority disapproval vote.

The problem is that in a public election for major offices there would be
polling. If minority candidates are *sure* that they would be defeated, then
they would encourage their *sincere* first choice supporters to vote
*insincerely* for a *weaker* candidate as a first choice or an early
additional choice (2nd, 3rd, etc.) rather than a later additional choice
(6th, 7th, etc.).

The above shows a reason why single winner elections for executive and
judicial offices should be nonpartisan and that such offices have no
legislative powers.



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