Majority Rule & Votes-For (to Demorep)

[Mike Ossipoff]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com writes:
> 
> Lucien Saumur wrote:
> I find this scheme artificial. [The scheme being the *votes against*
> Condorcet tie breaker].
> 
> I also find such tie breaker to be artificial. 

As I explained to Saumur, voting systems are proposed by people, not
picked from trees. Majority rule is generally agreed to be natural.
Condorcet's method, as I've demonstrated on this list numerous
times, carries out majority rule better than other methods.
If a full majority have ranked A over B, then B can't possibly
win in Condorcet's method unless every candidate similarly has
a majority against him/her.

Also, as I pointed out to Saumur, you may say that votes-against
is artificial, and yet this November, millions of progressives
are going to forfeit their opportunity to cast a vote-for, in
order to cast a vote-against. That's because many voters
insist upon casting a vote-against, a vote against the Republican.
They tell us that's the only reason why their vote for the Democrat,
whom they dislike. They routinely give up their chance to vote
_for_ someone they like better than the Democat in order to
cast a vote _against_ someone they like worse. Artificial?
Maybe, but it's what's important for them to do. Don't blame
me.

> Most average voters would think *votes for* some candidate (or issue choice)
> determines the election result and not *votes against*.

Noble sentiment. That's not how people vote. Every Democrat voter I
have spoken to has told me that they're only voting Democrat in order
to vote _against_ someone worse. No, most average voters do nothing
but vote against, if they vote at all. What country do you live in?


> The idea that with tie rankings (such as A=B) with x being 0 in a Condorcet
> tie breaker that the votes should not be counted is contrary to common sense.

What are you talking about? Are you saying that common sense requires
counting preference votes that the voter never cast? That common
sense requires falsifying votes in that way?

> The idea that non votes are to be counted twice with x being 1 in a Condorcet
> tie breaker is doubly contrary to common sense.

No one here is proposing that.


> 
> Condorcet supporters claim that the plain Condorcet method does away  with
> strategic voting but they keep bringing up comments about the effects of
> truncation and order reversals in their examples.

Nonsense. When I bring up truncation, it's to show that truncation
doesn't create a need for defensive strategic voting in Condorcet's
method, as it does in other Pairwise-Count methods. As I keep saying,
Condorcet doesn't require defensive strategy under plausible & reasonable
conditions, while other methods require it routinely under common
ordinary conditions.

Truncation needn't be strategically-intended, but it still happens
in all rank-balloting elections. Often there are more candidates
than a voter is willing to rank. And I never said that strategically-
intended truncation couldn't be tried in Condorcet--only that
it can't work.


> In other words, Condorcet has just as much strategic voting as any other
> voting method.

Again, nonsense. I've repeatedly shown why Condorcet's method doesn't
require defensive strategy under conditions where all other methods
do require it. Where have you been, Demorep? 

> 
> Worst of all, plain Condorcet supporters regard majority rule as an
> incidental afterthought being that they keep worrying about the lesser of
> evils (and not about the greater of goods).

It's the voters who worry very much about lesser-of-2-evils. I've
never heard of the "greater-of-2-goods" problem, Demorep--could
you define it for us, and give an example?

"Majority rule is an incidental afterthought?"  This, Demorep, is
the reason why I ask where you've been. Out to lunch? I've repeatedly
talked on this list about why Condorcet's method carries out majority
rule better than other methods.

If a full majority rank A over B, then B can't possibly win unless
every candidate (in the set from which Condorcet's choice rule
is to choose) similarly has a majority against him. In plain
Condorcet that set is the set of all the candidates. In Smith
Condorcet that set is the Smith set.
> 
> My conclusion-the Condorcet *votes against* tie breaker falls into the
> category of *wrong majority* methods (along with the MPV, approval voting and
> top 2 in runoff methods).
> 
> The remedy to save the concept of head to head pairings is simply to call
> choice voting Choice Voting (with variations for public elections, private
> elections, voter literacy and vote counting technology).
> 
> The general standard of the average voter is majority rule.

That standard is carried out by Condorcet's method. The big concern
of voters & electoral reformers is lesser-of-2-evils. Condorcet
gets rid of that problem.

> 
> See the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution- Art. IV, Sec. 4- The
> United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
> of Government ***. In the 1776-1787 era, the words *Republican Form* were
> used to mean majority rule (i.e. Democracy) in contrast to monarchy and
> oligarchy (both minority rule forms of government).
> A voter numbers his/her choices, 1, 2, 3, etc. Unacceptable choices get a
> zero (0) vote.
> A majority can with a zero (0) vote defeat any candidate.
> If no candidate survives, then the legislative body can elect the executive
> or judicial officers.
> If 3 or more candidates survive, then there is a divided majority.
> If no candidate beats each other candidate head to head, then 
> the *votes for* at the fewest number of choice levels needed can be combined
> until there is a majority winner.

You don't state you methods very clearly. But your "votes-for at highest
possible rank position" sounds like MPV. I've already talked about
that method's failure of majority rule.



> If there is no such majority winner (due to truncated votes), then the
> legislative body can elect the executive or judicial officers.
> 
> If a minority sure to be beaten wants to play strategic games in making its
> first choice (but more likely its second or third or later choices - or
> truncated non-choices), then so what. The winner will win with a majority
> (with the minority having to survive with its choice). 


You MPV people have a funny definition of majority rule.

> 
> Single winner methods are presumably not being done for lifetime World
> Dictator (despite the passion filled Condorcet examples naming living persons

What? We've been using a Presidential election, between some main
November canddiates for our examples. You're the one who used to
insists on Hitler & Stalin in your examples.

Excuse me for naming living persons in an example of a voting system.

> as if they are in an election for a super powerful legislative office) but

Ok, so you don't think the Presidency is a powerful office.


> for ordinary mortals who are in elective executive or judicial officers for a
> limited time.

Then that means you don't think single-winner reform is important. Then
why are you taking part in this discussion?

> .-
> 


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