Saumur: Circular ties, votes-against

[Mike Ossipoff]

Lucien Saumur writes:
> 
> In an article, dfb at bbs.cruzio.com (Mike Ossipoff) writes:
> 
> >Lucien Saumur writes:
> >> 
> >>           I do not understand what you mean by
> >> vote-against.
> >
> >Condorcet's method, as I've defined it, says that:
> >
> >If no 1 candidate beats each one of the others, then the winner is
> >the candidate who has the fewest voters ranking over him someone who
> >beats him.
> >
> >In other words, for each candidate, determine which candidate who beats
> >him is ranked over him by the most voters. The number of voters ranking
> >that other candidate over him is the measure of how beaten he is. The 
> >winner is the candidate least beaten by that measure.
> >
> >Because, in each pairwise comparison in which X is beaten, Condorcet's
> >circular-tie-breaker counts only the votes for the other candidate over
> >X, I call that "votes-against".
> 
>           Did Condorcet propose this tie-breaking scheme?

Condorcet proposed scoring the candidates according to their
worst defeat. He wasn't specific about how to measure that
defeat, probably since no one was considering the possibility
of short rankings. My proposal is a version of Condorcet's
method, as proposed by Condorcet. My proposal is consistent
with what Condorcet proposed. One of the possibilities implied
by his proposal. I've posted often here about why votes-against
is the desirable way to measure defeats.

> 
>           I find this scheme artificial. While circular

Voting systems are proposed by people, not picked from trees.

Is majority rule artificial too? Most would agree that it's natural.
Condorcet's method carries out majority rule where your random
method & your votes-for method wouldn't. When I say "Condorcet's
method", I'm referring to my votes-against  version of it.

In Steve's many-candidate example, there could be a majority ranking
Clinton over Dole, and Condorcet's method would count that. 
A method counting votes-for would ignore it, and would work more
like MPV, making anti-Dole votes sorry they didn't vote Clinto
in 1st place.

Look, in the U.S., this November, millions of progressives are
going to cast a vote-against, for which they're quite willing
to give up the opportunity to cast a vote for their favorite.
Condorcet's method lets them cast that reliably-counted vote-against,
while still voting their favorite in 1st place, and while still
ranking Clinton as low as they want to--provided that they merely
rank him over the candidate they want to defeat.

Votes-against are artificial? Tell that to the Democrat-voting
progressives--but they'll do it anyway.

> ties are logically possible, I am not sure that they are
> probable nor do I know what they would mean. I am inclined

I've repeatedly showed you that the common practice of truncation
will cause circular ties even when there's a candidate who, when
compared separately to each one of lthe others,  is preferred to
him by more voters than vice-versa. Trunction can take victory
away from Condorcet winners, in your methods, but not in Condorcet's
method.



> to think that they would mean that the voters have no great
> preference between the candidates involved in the tie. If
> my assumption is correct, then the winner may more simply
> and reasonably be decided by drawing lots.

Yes, if you don't value majority rule, and if you don't care
to get rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem.


> 
> __________________________________________
>           aa447 at FreeNet.Carleton.CA
>           http://www.igs.net/~lsaumur/
> .-
> 


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