Majority Rule and Votes For

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Lucien Saumur wrote:
I find this scheme artificial. [The scheme being the *votes against*
Condorcet tie breaker].

I also find such tie breaker to be artificial. 
Most average voters would think *votes for* some candidate (or issue choice)
determines the election result and not *votes against*.
The idea that with tie rankings (such as A=B) with x being 0 in a Condorcet
tie breaker that the votes should not be counted is contrary to common sense.
The idea that non votes are to be counted twice with x being 1 in a Condorcet
tie breaker is doubly contrary to common sense.

Condorcet supporters claim that the plain Condorcet method does away  with
strategic voting but they keep bringing up comments about the effects of
truncation and order reversals in their examples.
In other words, Condorcet has just as much strategic voting as any other
voting method.

Worst of all, plain Condorcet supporters regard majority rule as an
incidental afterthought being that they keep worrying about the lesser of
evils (and not about the greater of goods).

My conclusion-the Condorcet *votes against* tie breaker falls into the
category of *wrong majority* methods (along with the MPV, approval voting and
top 2 in runoff methods).

The remedy to save the concept of head to head pairings is simply to call
choice voting Choice Voting (with variations for public elections, private
elections, voter literacy and vote counting technology).

The general standard of the average voter is majority rule.

See the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution- Art. IV, Sec. 4- The
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government ***. In the 1776-1787 era, the words *Republican Form* were
used to mean majority rule (i.e. Democracy) in contrast to monarchy and
oligarchy (both minority rule forms of government).
A voter numbers his/her choices, 1, 2, 3, etc. Unacceptable choices get a
zero (0) vote.
A majority can with a zero (0) vote defeat any candidate.
If no candidate survives, then the legislative body can elect the executive
or judicial officers.
If 3 or more candidates survive, then there is a divided majority.
If no candidate beats each other candidate head to head, then 
the *votes for* at the fewest number of choice levels needed can be combined
until there is a majority winner.
If there is no such majority winner (due to truncated votes), then the
legislative body can elect the executive or judicial officers.

If a minority sure to be beaten wants to play strategic games in making its
first choice (but more likely its second or third or later choices - or
truncated non-choices), then so what. The winner will win with a majority
(with the minority having to survive with its choice). 

Single winner methods are presumably not being done for lifetime World
Dictator (despite the passion filled Condorcet examples naming living persons
as if they are in an election for a super powerful legislative office) but
for ordinary mortals who are in elective executive or judicial officers for a
limited time.