# [EM] More Demorep replies

Mike Ossipoff dfb at bbs.cruzio.com
Wed Mar 6 03:39:31 PST 1996

```DEMOREP1 at aol.com writes:
>
>        A. In
> Subj:  [EM] Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again Reply
> Date:  Mon, Mar 4, 1996 2:19 AM EDT
> From:  election-methods-list at eskimo.com
> X-From: DEMOREP1 at aol.com
> there was--
> <I leave it to folks to think of examples of circular results and <the fewest
> number of votes needed to elect under the <Condorcet tie breaker (especially
> with the D. 33 votes each <example).
>
> In each of the 42-41-16 first choice Hitler-Stalin-Middle A. B. C. examples

This doesn't tell us a hell of a lot about what the rankings are in
your example. As I & others have repeatedly asked you, couldn't
you write you examples in a way that doesn't have to be deciphered?

For instance:

42%: H, M, S
41%: M
16%: S, M, H

...so we'll know exactly what set of rankings you're talking about.

> circular results can occur if 27 voters of the 41 voters vote for the
> candidate having 16 votes to get
> 42 beats 41
> 41 beats 16
> 43 (16 + 27) beats 42.

If you're saying that it's always possible to make an intentionally-
caused circular tie, so what? Why would someone do it if they
couldn't benefit from it?

>
> The general case is that the candidate in the middle based on first choice
> votes will try to get his/her supporters vote their second choices for the
> candidate with the least number of first choice votes to produce circular
> results.

Not at all. The middle-size candidate might be the Middle candidate,
someone who couldn't benefit from a circular tie. The only person
who could benefit from a strategic circular tie would be a non-middle
candidate hoping to steal the election from a Middle Condorcet winner.

And if the middle-size candidate isn't Middle, then the opposite
candidate is bigger than he, and probably beats him, and he couldn't
make a strategic circular tie if he wanted to (All he could do would
be to turn a Middle victory into an opposite-extreme victory).

Well there's also the possibility that the biggest candidate is
Middle, in which case Middle is the Condorcet winner for sure. Then
the next biggest candidate could indeed profit from successful
order-reversal, which is what you seem to be implying. But I've
very carefully showed why that wouldn't be a problem. And, more
important perhaps, I've also showed why, even if that were a
likely thing, Condorcet still wouldn't have more strategy
problem than Approval.

Besides, as I've also carefully explained to you, with just
3 candidates, Middle voters have no reason to vote a 2nd choice,
in which case order-reversal by either extreme can accomplish
nothing other than the election of the opposite extreme. You're
still ignoring replies, and repeating statements that have

>
> For the Condorcet tie breaker, if the middle candidate (41) gets 1 more of

Who are you saying is the Middle candidate, the politically Middle
candidate? I assume that now when you say "middle" you mean "middle-size".
If you'd identify clearly what you mean, not only would we be more
likely to understand what you mean, but so would you.

How can we discuss your example if we don't know what it is? How can
you?

I'm really trying my best to continue trying to answer your letters,
but I have to say that you're making that difficult, & I may have to
reluctantly give up that effort, due to refusal to answer anything
that anyone else says, and, to a lesser extent, refusal to state
examples in a definite way. As Rob said, you're ignoring the rest
of us & monologue-ing.

> his/her supporters to vote for the last candidate (16), then he/she wins the
> Condorcet tie breaker (assuming the voters for the highest and lowest
> candidates do not make any second choices). That is,
> 42 beats 41, margin 1
> 41 beats 16, margin 25
> 44 (16+28) beats 42, margin 2
>

Again, which candidate is politically in the Middle? Which are the
extreme candidates? Are you talking about order-reversal strategy?
I've covered it thoroughly. Did you get my letters?? Or are you
talking about a natural circular tie. Something that I've also
discussed.

> The 41 candidate is the least beaten Condorcet tie breaker winner.

No, the 41 candidate isn't least beaten by Condorcet's rule. The
16 candidate is, since he only has 41% of the voter ranking over him
someone who beats him. Condorcet's method doesn't count margins:
It counts the absolute number of voters who have ranked over a
candidate a particular other candidate who beats him.

>
> The 42 candidate must thus encourage his/her supporters to vote their second
> choices for the 16 candidate to help the 16 candidate beat the 41 candidate.
>
> However to do so there is the major risk that the 16 candidate will win both
> against the 41 candidate and the 42 candidate.

To answer that I'd have to know more about your example than you
have told us. But I'll just say that your statements are based on
an incorrect notion of what Condorcet's method is.

>
>        B.  In the Hitler-Stalin-Middle 33-33-33 D. example if 1 voter in each
> of 2 groups votes a second choice for the other candidate, then there is
> (assuming no other second choice votes)
> 33-33
> 34 (33 +1)-33
> 34 (33 +1)-33.
> Thus with 35 votes (33 first choice votes and 2 second choice votes), a
> candidate could be elected (assuming no other second choice votes).

Again I don't know what you mean by the way you state your example.
Couldn't you be nice enough to tell us what percent vote what
rankings??

You probably are calculating margins, which, as I've said, isn't
what Condorcet's method counts. But if your point is that the
Middle candidate wins, by receiving 2nd choice votes from each
side, why is that a problem? The Middle candidate beats each of
the others 34 to 33 if people voted as you describe. In real life,
he'd beat each of the extreme candidates 66-33, because, as I said,
but which you apparently didn't read, the extreme voters in a 3-
candidate race have no reason not to vote for Middle in 2nd place.

But, either way, Middle wins because of getting 2nd choice votes from
the extremes. The candidate preferred to each of the others 66-33
wins. Are you saying that you consider that a problem??

>
>      C.    The result of the above is strategic fun and games regarding

Maybe you need to stop regarding this committee as fun-&-games, and
get serious, and read other people's comments.

> second choices (which just might be regarded by "average" voters as being
> totally corrupt as the gerrymander in legislative elections).

How is voting a 2nd choice totally corrupt like a gerrymander??

>           With 4 or more candidates the fun and games would really get
> complex for second and later choices.

I've talked about that too, carefully describing the situation. Check
out my letters about it. But the situation isn't as complex as you
say it is. Check out what I said.

>           The above should also show why there probably will be much
> truncation of voting if an additional choice is much different from an
> earlier choice producing lots of plurality winners.

What do you mean by "additional choice" & "earlier choice"? I've
already said that truncation is already known to be very common
in rank-balloting elections, but not usually so common that it
produces plurality winners. And people who know that they
need the Middle compromise wouldn't truncate.

>
>        D. The above raise the elementary questions-
> Should plurality winners be allowed ? I say no.

As I've said before, if voters who need the Middle compromise don't
rank him, that's their fault, and no voting system can protect them
from themselves. What do you want to do, add an extra rule to disallow
the result & not declare a winner if the person with a plurality wins?
Elect the person who would have won if everyone had voted a 2nd
choice?? Forget it.

> Should all executive and judicial elections be nonpartisan to lessen partisan
> extremism ? I say yes.
> .-

>

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