[EM] Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again Reply

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

My standard for a single winner office is whether a majority of the voters
absolutely (and not relatively) want a candidate to be elected to that
office.

Back to the Condorcet examples--

A. Middle is lowest (original example)
Hitler         Stalin            Middle
   42              41                  16    First Choice votes

B. Middle is middle
Hitler         Stalin            Middle
    16               42                  41     First Choice votes

C. Middle is highest
Hitler         Stalin            Middle
     41            16                   42    First Choice votes

Such 3 examples assume that one of the candidates has a relatively small
percentage of the total votes.

D. All candidates are very close with around 33 First Choice votes each.
 
There will obviously be polling before each election.

Would every voter's second choice within each first choice group be the same
in every example regardless of the number of votes for his/her first choice
(as estimated by polling)? Obviously not.

The candidates will obviously attempt to influence the second choice votes of
their supporters for strategic purposes --- especially (a) to get Condorcet
circular results (Hitler beats Stalin, Stalin beats Middle, Middle beats
Hitler or the three reversed cases) based on second choice votes that may be
only slightly less than a minus 100 percent total disapproval and (b) to
force Condorcet tie breakers. 

I leave it to folks to think of examples of circular results and the fewest
number of votes needed to elect under the Condorcet tie breaker (especially
with the D. 33 votes each example).

Something called "order-reversal cheating" has been mentioned.
Can there can be "cheating" in election reforms ???

Here it is worth noting that with C number of candidates there will be ((C x
C)-C) /2 pairs of candidates
C        Pairs
2          1
3          3
4          6
5          10
6          15
7          21

For visual purposes divide an expandable checkerboard along one diagonal. The
squares on half the checkboard minus the diagonal are the number of pairs.

How many "serious" candidates will be running for U.S. President (or other
major executive office) with a single winner method ?

What will be the probability of multiple Condorcet circular ties with
multiple candidates ?

How many candidates will be elected with de facto majority disapproval due to
the results of Condorcet tie breakers ?

No "so what" answers needed.

Thus, approval voting remedy remains. Each voter may approve one or more
candidates for the office using multiple same choices (0, 1, 2, etc.). If 2
or more candidates get a majority, then Condorcet may be used for the
tie-breaker (or just declare elected the candidate with the highest majority
depending on whether computer voting is available).

To a major extent, the whole discussion about single winner methods is
somewhat irrelevant if (1) legislative bodies are being elected with a
majority rule proportional representation system, (2) executive officers are
elected with short terms of office, (3) all officers can be recalled and (4)
there is a major constitutional reform allowing ordinary citizens to enforce
the laws directly.

Regarding (2), how many "controversial" U.S. Presidents (e.g. Mr. Johnson
during the Vietnam War, Mr. Nixon during Watergate, etc.) would have won 4
consecutive annual elections ?

Regarding (4), the use of "executive power" in the U.S. and State
constitutions has been generally interpreted by the courts to mean that
ordinary citizens lack standing to enforce "public" type laws - especially
the laws regulating the executive branch. 

If the laws regulate the activities of the executive branch (i.e. telling
executive officers absolutely or conditionally to do or not to do something),
then there is a continuous constitutional crisis if the executive officers
ignore such laws.

Witness especially the continuous crisis over activities of the U.S.
executive branch in foreign countries- Korean War, Vietnam War, Bosnia, etc.
etc. etc.

Thus, single winner election reform should be part of a constitutional reform
package.