[EM] [SW] Hitler-Stalin-Middle Example Again
seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Fri Mar 1 13:00:13 PST 1996
keywords: single winner election reform Condorcet pairwise
approval disapproval NOTB "None of the Above" dilemma
>Condorcet fans seem unable to comprehend that with 2 of 3
>candidates being "extremists" on a ballot that each "middle" voter
>will be in a tough situation about what to do about their second
>choice vote (if any).
There *is* a minor voter dilemma here, I think. If you slightly
prefer Hitler to Stalin you want to rank Hitler over Stalin. But if
you think Hitler has more support than Stalin then you want to rank
Stalin over Hitler, hoping to make Hitler "more beaten" than Middle
in the tie-breaking. If I'm wrong, then I need to work through some
tie-breaking examples until I get it.
Demorep's real point, missed by Rob and Mike since it wasn't clearly
stated, is that ordinary Condorcet allows a candidate disapproved by
majority to be declared the winner.
Condorcet+NOTB provides for a stronger vote against the disapproved
than leaving them unranked in ordinary Condorcet.
Condorcet+NOTB provides protection against majority-disapproved
candidates as strong as Approval's, and it doesn't have Approval's
tactical voting problems.
My dilemmaless vote: 1=Middle 2=NOTB
(I would vote 1=NOTB if I disapprove of Middle too.)
Rob & Mike et al, what's wrong with Condorcet+NOTB? Is it so
unlikely that all candidates will be disapproved that you're
comfortable with a dumbed-down ballot? Why the silence?
---Steve (Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)
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