a draft for voting report (fwd)

[Mike Ossipoff]

Mike Ossipoff writes:

This message was returned due to a rare foul-up, and so I'm re-sending
it after eliminating the line that caused the automated foul-up.

As I always say when forwarding something, the extra header that
follows is there because I don't have a way to delete lines or blocs
of text. My actual message is right after that header.

> From dfb Sun Jul 21 20:29:20 1996
> Subject: a draft for voting report
> To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
> Date: Sun, 21 Jul 96 20:29:16 PDT
> From: Mike Ossipoff <dfb at bbs.cruzio.com>
> Cc: dfb at bbs.cruzio.com
> X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL0]
> Message-ID:  <9607212029.aa29884 at cruzio.com>
> 
> A draft for the report on the single-winner method vote:
> 
> 
> After much discussion of single-winner methods, their advantages
> & disadvantages, the election-methods list has voted on 
> a single-winner method recommendation to the ER list.
> 
> [Note to EM members: The vote totals here are of course tentative,
> since more votes may come in]
> 
> Seven people voted in this election to determine a collective
> choice for a single-winner recommendation.
> 
> The winner was a method called "Smith//Condorcet", which will be
> defined later in this letter.
> 
> Smith//Condorcet beat each of the other proposed methods, where
> the word "beat" is used in the sense that A beats B if more
> voters rank A over B than vice-versa. But, no matter which of
> the proposed methods is used to count the rankings received in
> our election, Smith//Condorcet wins.
> 
> Smith//Condorcet beat its closest rival, Instant-Runoff (aka
> MPV, Hare's method, Preferential Voting, the Alternative Vote,
> the Elimination system) by 5 to 2.
> 
> Though Smith//Condorcet beat "plain Condorcet" (which will
> also be defined later in this letter) by a wide margin, both
> of the Condorcet versions beat Instant-Runoff. If the 
> first winner, Smith//Condorcet, is removed from the rankings,
> then, with the resulting rankings, plain Condorcet wins whether
> the rankings are counted by Smith//Condorcet, plain Condorcet
> or Instant-Runoff.
> 
> Here are the pairwise results for Smith//Condorcet, 
> plain Condorcet & Instant-Runoff:
> 
> Smith//Condorcet beat Instant-Runoff 7 to 2
> plain Condorcet beat Instant Runoff 4 to 3
> Smith//Condorcet beat plain Condorcet 3 to 1.
> 
> ***
> 
> Individual statements, and perhaps consensus statements, 
> comparing the proposed methods will soon be posted here, combined
> into a single posting. 
> 
> ***
> 
> Definitions of methods:
> 
> Instant-Runoff:
> 
> Repeatedly, eliminate from the rankings the alternative occupying
> highest position in fewest rankings.
> 
> As soon as an alternative occupies highest position in more than
> half of the rankings, it is declared winner.
> 
> 
> Plain Condorcet:
> 
> A beats B if more voters rank A over B than vice-versa.
> If 1 alternative beats each one of the others, then it wins.
> 
> If no 1 alternative beats each one of the others, then the winner
> is the alternative over whom fewest voters have ranked the
> alternative which, among those that beat it, is ranked over it
> by the most voters.
> 
> In other words:
> 
> For each alternative, determine which alternative that beats it
> is ranked over it by the most voters. The number of voters ranking
> that other alternative over it is the measure of how beaten it
> is. The winner is the alternative least beaten by that measure.
> 
> ***
> 
> Smith//Condorcet:
> 
> Use plain Condorcet to choose from the alternatives in the
> "Smith set":
> 
> The "Smith set" is the smallest set of alternatives such that
> every alternative in the set beats every alternative outside
> the set.
> 
> ***
> 
> Alternative wording for definition of Smith//Condorcet:
> 
> The "Smith Criterion" says: For any set of alternatives such
> that every alternative in the set beats every alternative outside
> the set, the winner must come from that set.
> 
> Smith//Condorcet: Use plain Condorcet to choose from among the
> alternatives whose victory wouldn't violate the Smith Criterion.
> 
> ***
> 
> Those 2 Smith//Condorcet definitions are equivalent. Both are
> offered in case one is clearer than the other. It isn't known
> yet which definition will be better-liked.
> 
> ***
> 
> Immediately after the posting of this message, a message will
> be posted in which the actual rankings received in EM's
> single-winner recommendation election are listed.
> 
> [To EM members: I suggest that the rankings might as well be
> listed without naming which ranking is from whom--anyone
> in EM who voted, or who didn't vote, is free to make a statement
> to ER]
> 
> ***
> 
> Shortly after the posting of the rankings, a combined message
> will be posted here by the EM list, containing individual
> statements comparing the proposed methods, and, if possible,
> a consensus statement.
> 
> ***
> 
> Mike
> 
> [I'm signing my name to this letter to EM, but of course it
> seems better for the vote report to ER to just be signed
> "Election-Methods list"]
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> .-
> 


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