NOTR in a circular tie

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

1.    I believe that in Nevada where NOTA is on the ballot (but is not
binding) it appears at the bottom of the candidates for each office.
 Example-
X
Y
Z
NOTA
That is NOTA is not NOTR.
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2.  RE: approval vs. disapproval--
I suggest that a candidate is ranked by each voter on a plus 100 percent to a
minus 100 percent scale.  Approval to me is if the voter thinks a candidate
is in the plus 100 percent to zero percent range and deserves a YES vote.
 Disapproval to me is if the voter thinks a candidate is in the zero percent
to minus 100 percent range and deserves a NO vote. 
Of course, lots of ignorant voters make their choices on very superficial
points- the candidate looks good, has a nice voice, kisses babies, etc.,
etc., etc.
    Thus, apparently according to Mr. Eppley, a YES vote is a relative vote
in a pairwise vote with a NO vote (such that everything is relative and that
there are no absolutes).  

   Good luck to Mr. Eppley with such idea in talking to the average
citizen-voter when such voter is voting on issues (such as-- Should activity
Z be made a felony ? YES or NO) or on candidates (such as-- Do you find
candidate W acceptable enough to be elected to public office X ? YES or NO).
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3. Mr. Eppley wrote:
But the strategy problems in some methods are significantly 
worse than in other methods.  Does Mr. Demorep agree with my
observation?

D-Yes, including plain Condorcet (with its truncation, order reversal and
circular tie possibilities).  To paraphrase Mr. E (replacing the language in
() with the language in []-
If (Demorep's Approved//Condorcet) [Mr. E's plain Condorcet] method is used,
I'd expect a lot of voters would (vote to approve) [vote for] only their
favorite (and vote to disapprove all) [and/or truncate and/or order reverse]
the other candidates, especially if their candidate is well-funded so s/he
can compete successfully in a rematch. 
      I assume Mr. Eppley sees no problem in the average voter's mind with
straight Condorcet winners being elected by a minority of all the voters
(such as B beats A, 45 to 41 and B beats C, 40 to 35 when there are 100
voters) without even worrying about circular tie breaker minority (of all 100
voters) Condorcet winners (with the winner being defeated in at least one of
his or her head to head pairings).   How *unlikely* or *implausible* are such
possibilities (with examples or in reality) ?
----
4.    Mr. Eppley wrote:
Here's Demorep's scare scenario:

  1 Hitler /
  1 Stalin /
 98 / Hitler, Stalin
 After this vote, a new election is held and an acceptable candidate (say,
Eisenhower) competes and is elected:
  1 Hitler /
  1 Stalin /
 98 Eisenhower / Hitler, Stalin

D- The scare scenario is Mr. Eppley's and not mine- a deliberate
misrepresentation.  I note however, that Mr. Eppley is apparently approving
the idea of majority disapproval by having both Mr. H and Mr. S losing (i.e.
his 98 / Hitler, Stalin).  I have repeatedly said that a p.r. legislative
body can fill any executive or judicial vacancy.  I assume that Mr.
Eisenhower will do some polling for the first election to see if he has any
support and then run since he has such high support.  How many candidates can
be expected using Condorcet for a high power office (U.S. President,
governor, big city mayor) when there is no incumbent running ?  I would
expect more than 2.   With a beloved incumbent (such as Mr. Eisenhower ?),
there is some very small possibility of having only 2 candidates.
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5.   To others-  Part of the problem is that Mr. Eppley is apparently using a
different dictionary from me for various words and symbols in various
postings (re-election, NOTA, /) such that sentence x makes no sense to one of
us and response sentence y makes even less sense to the other of us and
probably total nonsense to others.

6. As to  / meaning NOTR (none of the remaining candidates) as in G/KM or G >
NOTR > K > M---
I would suggest that such a NOTR would also cause major confusion for lots of
voters (along with NOTA).  The N(one) in NOTR would be deemed to be an
absolute vote and not a relative vote by lots of voters so would only vote G/

I will make the *absolute* wild assumption that the average voter barely has
the intelligence (despite dubious current public education, TV, computer
games and sundry other diversions) to vote such as--
D   1    Approve
E   4
F   2    Approve
G   3  
H   6    Disapprove
J   5    Disapprove
(The voter might not have sufficient info to have an opinion on E or G)
With computer voting (and having the names of the candidates rotated) the
*Approve* or *Disapprove* might result from the use of icon-text buttons (as
in sundry computer programs that use icon-text buttons - all Macintosh and
Windows 95 programs, etc.) next to the name of each candidate.  The *Approve*
or *Disapprove* might have to be *Acceptable* or *Not acceptable* or even
*Yes* or *No* since language challenged folk might have problems with
*Approve* or *Disapprove*.   I say again, a large part of the U.S. population
is a combination of language challenged, logic challenged and math challenged
due to the continuous U.S. and State minority rule gerrymander governments
and the public so-called education system produced by such governments. I am
not sure if the average citizen knows the meaning of such words as majority,
minority, plurality, ranking, approve or disapprove.   Any election reform
attempt involves M-A-J-O-R public education.  For example- how many of the NO
votes on the San Francisco proportional representation vote were based on
total ignorance of what p.r. involves (resulting in the well known effect of-
 when in doubt, vote NO) ?