Demorep1: Truncation. Approval.

[Hugh Tobin]

I agree with Mike that an improvement over superimposing Approval on
Condorcet would be to add a token to the ballot stating the actual
alternative to electing a candidate.  I have further suggestions as to
what the alternative should be.

In the case of an executive office, leaving the position vacant is not
an
option; the buck must stop somewhere.  "Status quo" means the incumbent
wins.  The alternative should be that the legislative body chooses the
executive.  If there is no candidate that the electorate would prefer
over an unkown choice to be made by the House of Representatives, or
city council, then that unknown choice could be considered Condorcet
winner.

For legislative and judicial positions, there is another option: a
district or state could go unrepresented, or at large elections could
produce a body smaller than authorized by law.  A problem arises if
disapproval reduces the size of the body to zero, or but this may be
more theoretical than real, and rules could be devised to deal with it. 
Thus, for legislative elections one could use Condorcet with "no winner"
as an alternative, rather than having a separate "approval/disapproval"
option; the former method should be less susceptible to strategic
manipulation.  For judicial races the option of appointment by the
governor should probably be added or substituted, so as to avoid excess
caseloads, or deadlocks due to an even number on a supreme court.

I do not think "hold a new election soon" should be on the ballot, as
this plays into the hands of well-organized or well-funded extremists or
special interests who can do a better job of getting out the vote in a
later special election with smaller turnout, after the general
electorate has tired of the process. It is already doubtful why the
average voter, not driven by ideological zeal, should take the time to
make his decisions and cast his ballot in the general election, knowing
that it is extremely unlikely that his vote will make a difference in
any race, but at least there is efficiency involved in voting on
numerous races at once, and high-profile races attract voters who
otherwise would not bother to express their preferences for lesser
offices, even though those preferences are sincerely and rationally
held. To expect the average voter to come back to the polls to vote
again in a single race after the general election, is too much.

-- Hugh Tobin