Demorep: Truncation. Approval.

[Mike Ossipoff]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com writes:
> 
> 1. When there are 2 candidates, they obviously go head to head. There is no
> magical change when there are 3 or more candidates.  Such 3 or more
> candidates can and should obviously go head to head.  One of the candidates
> could be the compromise candidate who beats each of the other candidates.
> ----
> 2. There is a major truncation problem with plain Condorcet (especially when
> the numbers of first choice votes for the higher candidates are roughly equal
> such as 45-42-13 or 35-34-31).

Demorep says that there's a major truncation problem, but he neglects
to tell us how he reached that conclusion. I've answered this
claim so many times I've stopped counting sometime last year.

As I saids in a recent reply, Condorcet's method is 
truncation-resistant, meaning that truncation can never
gain the election of an alternative over which a majority
have ranked a universal winner. In that other recent posting
I demonstrate why Condorcet is truncation-resistant. 
As I said in the other posting, the supporters of the 2
extreme alternatives have nothing to gain by truncating,
have nothing to lose by not tuncating, and have much
to lose by truncating.

Why they have much to lose by truncating is quite obvious,
or should be: If you need the middle compromise & don't
include it in your ranking, then you're screwing up, big time.

And, as for why the extreme voters have nothing to lose
by voting a wnd choice, how can it count against their
favorite if they vote for their 2nd choice over their
last choice?

We've got these broken records, endlessly repeating the same
refuted arguments, completely oblivious to the people who
have, each time, taken the time to reply to them.
 
But Demorep is correct about the need for 2-alternative
comparisons. When talking about majority rule, or preferences,
it just isn't meaningful to talk about the kind of vote
that sits on 1 alternative. In a multi-alternative rank-
balloting count, talking about a count of votes that are
sitting on 1 candidate, and doing an absolute votecount
of those votes, is like asking "Is a duck bigger?" Majority
rule has to be about something that a majority is clearly
saying. Unless something has an outight 1st choice majority,
a count of who has most, or fewest, 1st choice votes just
isn't meaningful for talking about what a majority says it
wants.

> 
> As I have commented, a  majority yes/no vote on each candidate (combined with

As others have commented, absolute "yes" votes would be meaningless
as something to add to a rank-balloting. Absolute "No" votes could
be an additional way of judging majority rejection in a rank-balloting
election, but as people have pointed out, there are conflicts between
relative & absolute preference counts in the same election. lf you
insist on adding an absolute "No" count, then relative preferences
can be violated as a result. Hybridization is the polite word...

Aside from that, even if you want to add absolute "No" votes,
to disqualify anyone with those from a majority, you can't deny
that Condorcet is a giant improvement over Plurality & IRO,
and that, even to you who want absolulte-No, Condorcet without
it doesn't take away freedoms or rights that voters now have.

So, why not ease up about that? Why not save your proposal
to add absolute-disapproval for a later addition, after
Condorcet is adopted. What's wrong with one thing at a
time? Your absolute-disapproval is something incidental
to Condorcet, and you're mistaken when you insist on
making it part of the Condorcet reform.

Unless, of course, you can show that the public would be
much more enthusiastic about single-winner reform if it
included absolute-disaproval in the initial proposal. But
no amount of talking here can establish how the public
feels; that requires polling & focus groups. Unless you do
those things, you don't have the information you need to
argue that issue.

> head to head rankings) will encourage the making of additional choices.
> 
> If only 1 candidate gets majority support, then he/she wins. 

Are you familiar with Approval's strategy problems? Apparently
not. Do you approve your 2nd choice, if you aren't sure whether
you need it? If you do, you might push it over a majority, while
its supporters might betray you by strategically refusing to
approve your favorite. You've been had, buddy. Why do you insist
on bringing Approval strategy problems into Condorcet elections?
Your candidate, without the broad "approval" that your rival
got (thanks, sucker) is out of the election.

Approval looks good when compared to IRO, but not when compared
to Condorcet.

> 
> If only 2 candidates get majority support, then they go head to head.
> 
> if there are 3 or more majority continuing candidates---
> (a) The supporters of minority defeated candidates will, if they want to have
> any influence, make additional choices (i.e. support the least evil
> candidate(s) (in their opinion) among the majority continuing candidates).
> 
> (b) The supporters of majority continuing candidates will, if they want to
> counteract the votes of the supporters of minority defeated candidates, make
> additional choices.
> 
> .-
> 


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