First Debate on DEMOREP1's 2-1-2 Example
Rob Lanphier
robla at eskimo.com
Mon Dec 2 21:40:39 PST 1996
This is a good post. I have some questions, though...
On Mon, 2 Dec 1996 donald at mich.com wrote:
> Dear DEMOREP1, I am willing to accept your Instant Run-off example for
> debate but I have some conditions.
>
> Condition One: These five voters are experienced in three election methods
> - Plurality - Instant Run-off - Condorcet.
>
> Condition Two: Before the election the voters are told which method is
> going to be used to crunch the results - and only that method can be used
> on the returns of that election.
>
> Condition Three: There is to be three elections on one ballot - Plurality -
> Instant Run-off - Condorcet - as follows:
>
> Plurality | Instant Run-off | Condorcet
> vote for one | 1 2 3 | 1 2 3
> A [] | A [] [] [] | A [] [] []
> B [] | B [] [] [] | B [] [] []
> M [] | M [] [] [] | M [] [] []
>
> I say the results of these three elections will be as follows:
>
> Plurality | Instant Run-off | Condorcet
> 2 A | 2 AM | 2 A
> 2 B | 2 BM | 2 B
> 1 M | 1 MB | 1 M
>
> The Instant Run-off results are the same as your example.
This is a fair and most likely accurate assumption.
> The results of the Condorcet election will be the same as the Plurality
> election. The reason for this is because EXPERIENCED voters in a Condorcet
> election will not make a second selection - because they know that the
> second selections will be used to help some candidate other than the
> candidate of their first choice.
Two questions:
1. Are the voters aware of semi-accurate polling data (or in a genuine 5
person election, do they have a pretty good idea of who the others would
rank on top)?
2. What is the tie-breaker assumed to be in all cases (especially
Condorcet)? If we are to assume experienced voters here, then they would
undoubtedly factor in the tie-breaker in an election so likely to produce
a tie.
Rob
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