NOTA in a circular tie

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Eppley wrote:
But it would be nice if he [Demorep1] would explain WHY he thinks B's
disapproval is more important to the voters than the fact that a majority
prefer B more than A.  
---
D writes:
I wrote earlier but repeat- a relative vote (B > A) based on an absolute
disapproval of the candidate (B is unacceptable to be elected) is a
fraudulent vote (and gives any such B candidate who might otherwise be the
relative winner a false sense of public approval).
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Mr. Eppley wrote:

The question involves a circular tie between A, B, and NOTA:
   A > NOTA > B > A

Why should NOTA be treated differently than a normal choice in a circular
tie?
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D writes:
A vote for NOTA (none of the above) (if it is going to be on ballots) is a
special case and is an absolute vote, not a relative vote.  That is, if a
majority of the voters vote NOTA, NOTA wins (i.e. NOTA goes to the head of a
voter's ballot and the majority's combined ballots making NOTA a de facto
NOTB (none of the below)). 
I would suggest not having NOTA on the ballot-- i.e. require a voter to
approve or disapprove each candidate individually.   

A reasonable ballot access requirement, (such as 0.5 percent of the votes
cast at the last election for the office) combined with a majority approval
or disapproval vote (especially the latter) will eliminate the extremists for
executive and judicial offices.  I repeat- leftwing and rightwing extremists
can run for a p.r. legislative body and expound their views as in sundry
European p.r. elections.