NOTA in a circular tie (was RE: Demorep1: Truncation. Approval.)

[Steve Eppley]

>Mr. Eppley wrote:
>>Here's a question for Demorep.  Suppose the voters:
>>  1) majority-approve A,
>>  2) majority-disapprove B, and
>>  3) majority-prefer B more than A.
-snip-

Demorep replied:
-snip-
>A wins without having to go head to head with B.  
-snip-

That reply is consistent with Demorep's previous writing.  But it
would be nice if he would explain WHY he thinks B's disapproval is
more important to the voters than the fact that a majority prefer 
B more than A.  

The question involves a circular tie between A, B, and NOTA:
   A > NOTA > B > A

Why should NOTA be treated differently than a normal choice in a 
circular tie?

---Steve     (Steve Eppley    seppley at alumni.caltech.edu)