More Re: LO2E-2 & Iterative Condorcet

[Mike Ossipoff]

It seems to me that Iterative Condorcet strictly meets LO2E-2, even
without the use of the subcycle rule.  Using the symbols in
my definition of LO2E-2, if the voters in set M refuse to
rank any candidate in set S2, and one of them wins a particular
round, then all of them will extend 1st choice status to
their next choice that doesn't yet have it, and, since they've
all ranked all the S1 candidates over all the S2 candidates,
then eventually the winner will be in S1, and that will
remain true after all the iterations. At least the winner
certainly won't be from S2.

Iterative Condorcet is probably easier to explain to the public
than the subcycle rule, so, since it gives Condorcet the
automatic LO2E-2 compliance of Bucklin, that's a reason toi
propose Iterative Condorcet instead of Condorcet with the
subcycle rule. Then of course there's the fact that Iterative
Condorcet adds a whole additional level of making succesful
cheating unlikely & difficult, as compared to ordinary
Condorcet (though ordinary Condorcet & ordinary Smith//Condorcet
do a good enough job for public elections, it seems to me),
and thereby probably makes it possible to say that
Iterative Condorcet virtually meets the stronger LOE
criteria, the perfect method criteria written by Steve
& Rob.

I'm pretty much sure that Iterative Condorcet has
these benefits, and the main question is how good
a method is needed for public elections. A method that,
like Condorcet & Smith//Condorcet, gets rid of the
significant bulk of the LO2E problem, or a more refined
version like Iterative Condorcet, that pushes even closer
to idealness.


Mike





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