New SW method: Weighting with elimination etc.

Mike Ossipoff dfb at
Tue Apr 30 03:49:12 PDT 1996

Steve Eppley writes:
> DEMOREP1 at wrote:
> [snip]
> >Any method must guarantee that a candidate with a majority of the
> >first choice votes wins
> [snip]
> This criterion is not universally accepted.  Some people believe
> that if the majority's support of their first choice is only lukewarm
> (compared to their second choice, etc.), and the minority is strongly
> opposed to that choice, then the majority's candidate shouldn't
> necessarily win. 

Ideally, maybe, but this depends on the assumption of sincere
point ratings.

> It's not correct to assume that being ranked second is a poor ranking.
> (The fallacy in Hare's method.)
> Example:
>    ,---------------------- A
>    |       ,-------------- B
>   99      98    (51 votes)
>    0      99    (49 votes)
> ------- -------
>   50.49   98.49 = averages
> A is the majority winner (51 to 49), but B looks like the best
> group choice, assuming the votes were sincere and not strategic. 

But that's a very big assumption. In a public election there's
no chance that many voters would keep voting sincerely when
they realize they can do better if they don't. For instance,
in your example, the B voters, the 51%, would have no incentive
to give A any points, in a point-rating election. B would then
win. Even in a many candidate election, a group consisting of
a majority would be able to get what it wants, and would 
strategize in order to do so. The important thing is to
not force people to use strategy in order to get what they're
numerically able to get. e.g. Progressives shouldn't have to
abandon fully voting the progressive over the Democrat in order
to help the Democrat beat the Republican, in case the progressive
can't win, & the progressive + Democrat group constitutes a majority
that can beat the Republican. The lesser-of-2-evils problem.



> --Steve
> .-


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