Fairness, votes against, and Condorcet(x)

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

1. With respect to the x = 0, .5 or 1 issue, the results must produce
plurality results in total truncation cases.

Example 1- 
A   46
B   41
C     8
No second choices voted. Candidate A obviously has 46 votes ranking over
candidates B and C. The x factor is obviously 1 for each A vote ranking over
the technically unranked B and C.
For such 46 voters the x factor in B versus C is obviously 0.
In other words-
(a) if a voter votes for a candidate, then that vote is a "1" vote against
any unranked candidate,
(b) if a voter does not vote for a candidate, then that nonvote is 0 between
such candidate and each other candidate not voted for (i.e. unranked).

Example 2
10 voters vote A and B equally
45 voters vote A
35 voters vote B
A obviously wins 55 to 45
Thus, (c) if a voter gives an equal ranking vote to two or more candidates,
then in the pairings of such candidates, each candidate gets 1 vote (which
cancel each other out when the total votes for each in the pairing are
subtracted).

2. Regarding the Dole,Clinton,Nader examples---
I repeat again that the obvious single winner standard is majority rule (if
possible). There must be a disapproval vote first to remove candidates
disapproved by a majority. 

Can Dole, Clinton or Nader survive a majority disapproval vote?

Any Condorcetish method in effect tries to find a winner from the remaining
candidates (if any) (which was the point I made in the remedy to the recent 3
Apples-Chocolate example in which using plain Condorcet a candidate
disapproved by a majority could win against a divided set of candidates each
approved by a majority).

3. The "english" definitions in constitutional language of the method to use
to produce a single winner must be different (to get adopted by the public)
than that used by the computer programmers to produce the array results of
candidates combinations and the summaries of who beats who.