York's version of Nanson's method
landerso at ida.org
Sun Apr 28 06:37:29 PDT 1996
It seems pretty clear to me that Mike York's voting method is essentially
equivalent to Nanson's voting method. (To see this, normalize to C-1, where C
is the number of candidates, instead of normalizing to 1.) The difference
between the two can be viewed as concerning the particular way that York's
method handles ties and near-ties in voter's rankings.
Hanson's voting method eliminates candidates by lowest Borda score, like
STV/Hare eliminates candidates by lowest number of first-place votes. Hanson's
voting method satisfies Smith's generalized Condorcet criterion, so it satisfies
all the criteria implied by that criterion. However, like (so it seems, every)
other elimination method, Nanson's voting method is not monotonic. Accordingly,
I think that it is much worse than Smith//Condorcet (by any definition
reasonable of Condorcet), Copeland, or Regular-Champion (for example).
According to the academically well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, any
voting method essentially either is dictatorial or is not strategy proof (i.e.,
if it is not dictatorial, then it can be manipulated).
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