[EM] MAMPO is probably better than MDDA

[Michael Ossipoff]

I distinguish strategy criteria from embarrassment criteria. SFC, SDSC and 
FBC are strategy criteria, and are all-important for the best voting 
systems, in my opinion.

The Plurality Criterion is an embarrassment criterion only, and therefore 
isn't important to me.

Yes, MMPO's Plurality violation is so outrageous that even I had to abandon 
MMPO. But no method fails Plurailty like MMPO.

Here's how I answer about failure of embarrassment criteria:

"If MDDA chooses someone in violation of Plurality, then that winner must be 
a remarkably well-like and un-disliked Plurality loser. S/he has no majority 
preferring anyone else to hir, and s/he is ranked by more voters than anyone 
else is, suggesting that s/he is acceptable to more people than anyone else 
is."

MAMPO can have an easier handcount than MDDA, if most candidates are 
disqualified in the majority approval test. But MDDA is _much_ more 
proposable, simple and transparent than MAMPO.That's because MDDA's pairwise 
count part is in the majority disqualification test, while MAMPO's pairwise 
count part is in the final choice part, where it takes the form of a MinMax 
method, which makes it much more awkward and complicated and less 
transparent for most people.

I'd much rather propose MDDA than MAMPO, in spite of the Plurality 
Criterion.

By the way, the names MPOA (Majority Pairwise Opposition//Approval) and MAPO 
(Majority Approval//Pairwise-Oppositon) are simpler, briefer and bring out 
the symmetry between the two methods.

Mike Ossipoff