[EM] Complete sincere Nash equilibria test posting

[Juho]

On Feb 25, 2007, at 14:54 , Michael Ossipoff wrote:

>
> I left a few words out of this posting, so I'm re-posting it in more
> complete form:
>
> Juho--
>
> I told you this:
>
> With wv, when there's a CW, there's always a Nash equilibrium in  
> which the
> CW wins and no one reverses a preference.
>
> With margins, there are situations in which the only Nash  
> equilibria are
> ones that involve order-reversal, even when there's a CW.
>
> How does that make you feel about margins?

This one did not change my feelings much. If you'd say something  
similar about sincere votes, and would provide examples that  
demonstrate that this can happen in real life and that the game  
theoretic choices would be obvious to the voters, maybe then. But now  
this seems a bit like one addition to the long list of theoretical  
claims about the properties of different methods. The impact of all  
the different theoretic criteria to the applicability of the voting  
methods in real life situations is not that easy to estimate.

This criterion sounds a bit tailored to me. I find the "no  
strategies"/"sincere" border line more interesting target of study  
than the "no reversal" border line.

I also don't like the Nash equilibrium game in the sense that  
approach seems to indicate that requiring strategic changes in the  
ballots is ok. I'm trying to stay and keep the voters within the  
sincere voting model.

In the subsequent mail you discussed the name of the criterion:
 > Sincere Nash Equilibrium Criterion (SNEC), or
 > the Unreversed Nash Equilibrium Criterion (UNEC).

Using some variant with word "unreversed" sounds more exact to me  
than a variant with word "sincere".

Juho


P.S. Just an observation, in case you are interested. Few months back  
I wrote on this list about "Ranked Preferences". One reason behind  
discussing such methods was to see what alternatives there are to  
truncation and winning votes (for situations where strategic threats  
are _considered_ so bad that basic Condorcet methods without any  
protection methods (e.g. mm(margins) ) are _considered_ not to be  
enough).


>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
> ----
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
> list info


		
___________________________________________________________ 
Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html