[EM] RE : Re: A few concluding points about SFC, CC, method choice, etc.

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi,

--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> At 11:21 AM 2/16/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >What I mean is, if you create two arbitrary methods, one satisfying
> >MF and one not, you should expect the first one to have higher utility.
> 
> This is weird, actually. It could be the case that there are one 
> thousand different election methods, and there is one which generates 
> maximum utility. I'd guarantee that this method won't satisfy MF in 
> all elections.

Hm? "Maximum utility" meaning "matches the SU winner perfectly" or
"matches the SU winner the best among methods that actually exist"?

In the former case it's not clear this method actually exists. In the
latter case I'd guess that you shouldn't guarantee this.

> Yes, the statement is true, but it is completely off the point. We 
> are not comparing "arbitrary methods."

It's not off the point. It's a response to this comment of yours:

"Too often, when we consider methods by election criteria, we assume that
a criterion is desirable, entirely apart from whether or not it chooses 
the optimum winner."

This makes it sound like you don't understand why criteria are used or
think that they are inherently at odds with SU. That's why I replied in
the way I did.

> It is obvious that MF has a utility. It is unlikely to choose a truly 
> bad candidate. But methods which specifically optimize utility are 
> going to fail MF. That's the point.

As far as I'm aware, there is no way at this point to conclude that there
is a method failing MF that optimizes utility better than every method
that satisfies MF. Or vice versa for that matter.

If you want to posit sincerity, though, then never mind this comment.

> I've argued that the majority has the right of decision. In this 
> example, if the majority wants to ensure the election of A so much 
> that it is willing to damage society, overall, it may do so. It 
> simply votes B at a lower rating, sufficiently low that B loses. But, 
> and I've given this argument again and again, this willingness 
> conflicts with an assumption: that the majority values B at 80.
> 
> No, if they are willing to lower B's rating to very low, which is 
> what it would take, it is necessarily true that they place a higher 
> relative value on the election of A than the supposedly sincere 
> ratings indicate.
> 
> There is a conflict in the assumptions, if we think that the A voters 
> will vote insincerely. There has to be a motive to vote insincerely, 
> a gain expected, and the gain cannot be trivial. Most people, in my 
> opinion, won't lie on a matter of importance for trivial gain (and 
> especially when their vote is anonymous).

I commented on this idea some time ago. I think I would find it more
interesting and convincing if you (or someone) would propose some 
formulas, so that we can determine how to transform sincere ratings into
ratings that take into account the voter's willingness to take full
advantage of the method.

Otherwise it is not obvious how, or if, you can compare preference
strength to the voter's likelihood of being strategic.

> If you really think B is quite good -- and 80% is quite good -- then 
> why would you rate B at zero, merely in order to get a slight 
> improvement in personal utility, while at the same time knowing that 
> you are going to be seriously disappointing half the society?

If you're saying that
1. electing A seriously disappoints half of society, and
2. I do not want to seriously disappoint half of society

Then I don't see how it can possibly be that I rate A higher than B.

> This is a basic question, a different view of human nature than is 
> being expressed by some. Are people generally out only for 
> themselves? Will they impoverish their neighbors for a small gain?
> 
> We know that people can be selfish. But *how* selfish? If you 
> discover that burning your neighbor's house down, and you are sure 
> you can get away with it, will somehow raise your own property value 
> by a few thousand dollars, would you do it? How would most people 
> answer this question, and how would they act if actually faced with 
> the situation.

The answer to the house-burning question is that it doesn't matter,
because we can set up laws and institutions to handle the case that
people do think it is worth burning each other's houses down.

Similarly for voting methods.

Kevin Venzke


	

	
		
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