[EM] Brief Approval vs RV clarification

Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Fri Feb 16 09:43:24 PST 2007


RV’s strategy problem in comparison to Condorcet is a subject that we’ve 
already discussed. RV’s strategy problem in comparison to Approval is that 
sincere voters can be had by strategizers.

You might say, truly, that a person can make the choice about whether they 
want sincerity or strategic power. Maybe you’d rather vote sincerely than 
maximize strategic advantage. Make a statement by voting sincerely. Yes, but 
now imagine that it’s an important issue, and you’re on the side of the more 
sincere voters. Your faction is going to be had. You won’t like that.

Our public elections are the exception, for me, because when the 
progressives who would approve H. Clinton and Nader might give Clinton a 
little less than Nader in RV, that’s a good thing, in my opinion. That’s why 
public elections are the exception to RV having a strategy disadvantage with 
respect to Approval. I fully admit that that exception is based on my own 
opinion of what’s wrong with progressive voting tendencies.

Approval doesn’t put people in the position of choosing between two 
drastically different strategic and sincere ways of voting, and it won’t 
make you regret the sincerity of your co-factionists.

Mike Ossipoff





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