[EM] SFC[2]

[Michael Ossipoff]

Warren says:

Indeed, > "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a > 
majority of all the voters > prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote 
sincerely, then Y shouldn't win." here is a stronger property: SFC2: if 
there's a CW, and no one falsifies, then the CW wins. And this property is 
obeyed exactly by Condorcet methods. Warren D Smith

I reply:

“SFC2” is met by no method. What if a large number of voters truncate the 
CW? That isn’t falsifying.

But if you make “SFC2” meetable and useful, then you have my wording of the 
Condorcet Criterion, which I posted here years ago.

Condorcet Criterion (Ossipoff’s wording):

If there’s a CW, and if everyone votes sincerely (as Ossipoff defines 
sincere voting), then the CW should win.

[end of Condorcet Criterion definition)

CC is not a stronger property than SFC. CC’s premise requires that everyone 
vote sincerely. SFC’s premise requires only that a majority vote sincerely. 
It is because CC is weaker that CC is met by every pair-wise-count method, 
while SFC is met only by the wv Condorcet methods (and maybe a very few 
other methods).

With SFC, that majority has its guarantee as long as others don’t falsify. 
With CC no one has a guarantee unless _everyone_ not only doesn’t falsify, 
but votes sincerely, as I define sincere voting.

Mike Ossipoff