[EM] Getting carried away and claiming RV is as good as Condorcet...

[Scott Ritchie]

On Fri, 2007-02-09 at 01:54 -0500, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
> As he noted, the result that Range is more successful at picking the 
> sincere Condorcet winner than Condorcet methods is, to say the least, 
> counterintuitive. The problem, of course, is strategic voting, where 
> voters do not express their sincere preferences, fearing that if they 
> do, the result will be less satisfactory than if they shift them.
> 
> One of the characteristics of Range is that there is never an 
> incentive to reverse preferences. Strategic or insincere voting in 
> Range is limited to equating candidates at the extremes when, in 
> fact, you do have a preference between them. Warren calls this 
> partially sincere. I've called it "magnification;' the gain on an 
> amplifier has been increased until the output pegs the meter. The 
> contrast on an image has been increased until some detail is lost in 
> total black or white. It isn't insincere in the same way as 
> preference reversal is.

So, wait, was half the Condorcet electorate strategic voting by doing
order reversal?  Are we making the assumption that strategic voting is
exactly as common in range and Condorcet in these simulations?

That seems a bit strong, exactly because the risks are different and the
information required is greater for Condorcet.

Thanks,
Scott Ritchie