[EM] Asset Voting
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Tue Feb 6 11:33:26 PST 2007
I see that there is no Electowiki page on Asset Voting. So I'm
starting a thread to gather some commentary on it.
Asset Voting, the name, was apparently invented by Warren Smith. In
his version, candidates are awarded a number between 0 and 1, with
the restriction that the sum of numbers awarded should equal one.
Then the total votes received by an individual candidate is
reassignable by the candidate to create a winner or winners. This
essentially turns an election where winners do not appear from the
direct votes into a deliberative process, conducted on behalf of the
voters by those trusted by them.
It's thus a variation on delegable proxy, which is how I came to be
interested in it initially.
Variations have been proposed:
(1) Candidates publish a list of reassignments that they will follow.
However, this loses the flexibility that simple Asset has, the
negotiation component is lost. If the list is not a binding promise,
it could be useful. Don't vote for someone you don't trust!
(2) Fractional Approval Asset Voting was my suggestion. In this, the
votes are restricted to 1 whole vote per candidate, but the ballot is
normalized so that the sum of votes is one vote. The advantage of
this simplification is that the ballot is quite simple. The voter
either delegates his or her vote to a single candidate, or to a
virtual committee.
(3) It is fairly simple to use Asset Voting for Proportional
Representation, creating a quite exact peer assembly, with,
nevertheless, district connection with elected members being quite
likely for many or most. This is enabled most specificaly by
encouraging candidates to reassign votes in precinct blocks. (This
could create some error in precision of number of voters per seated
member, but at the great advantage of voters knowing *exactly* who
was elected by their vote.)
I recall having read somewhere about another independent invention of
Asset Voting, I'd appreciate if anyone has references.
I'll only note one special feature of Asset, one reason why it is
worthy of serious consideration:
The voter is totally free to vote for anyone. Electability is not
relevant. There is utterly no pressure for strategic voting. The only
requirement is that the candidate voted for be one who is
identifiable and who is willing to take part in the public part of the process:
The reassignment process, presumably, is public; it is not, I would
think, a fixed thing with all reassignments taking place in one "poll."
If I had my choice of election methods, I'd either pick Asset or
Delegable Proxy. DP, however, does not create a peer assembly, which
might be considered desirable; rather it would normally create --
unless it is used in the Asset manner -- a body with members having
variable voting power.
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