[EM] Rank methods for if SSD is rejected

[Michael Ossipoff]

Because of the universal angry opposition that Approval seems to meet, with 
members of the public, and because RV can be tarred with the same brush, 
it’s a good idea to consider rank methods instead.

As I was saying, SSD is my favorite. My best girlfriend said that SSD wasn’t 
too complicated and that it sounded compelling. She wasn’t just being nice; 
she expressed disagreement when she disagreed.

A version of SSD that is clone proof even in small electorates is used by 
one or more organizations, showing that some don’t consider it too 
complicated.

But the IRVists, and the CVD IRVists in particular, claim that all Condorcet 
methods are too complicated. Of course they have an ulterior motive, because 
they want to argue against any rival for their own proposal, IRV.

My JoAnn Q. Public consultant says that SSD is too complicated. I 
corresponded with an organization-leader who was using PC,  saying that 
other Condorcet versions were too complicated to gain acceptance in his 
organization. So some will say that.

So, in case SSD isn’t accepted, because some consider it complicated, it’s 
worth looking at other methods to propose if SSD is rejected. That would be 
the purpose and condition for proposing  the following methods:

MDDA is simpler than Condorcet, but it meets SFC and SDSC, as well as FBC.

MDDA (Majority Defeat Disqualification//Approval):

Disqualify every candidate over whom a majority have ranked someone else. 
(unless doing so would disqualify all candidates). Elect the un-disqualified 
candidate who is ranked by the most voters.

[end of MDDA definition]

But MDDA’s use of an Approval count could cause it to be rejected by the 
anti-Approval prejudice.In that case, MDDB could be proposed:

MDDB (the B stands for Borda, because the method uses something similar to 
Borda):

Disqualify every candidate over whom a majority have ranked someone else 
(unless doing so would disqualify all candidates. Elect the candidate over  
whom (summed over all the ballots) fewest candidates are ranked.

[end of MDDB definition]

MDDA meets SFC, SDSC, and FBC.

MDDB meets SFC and FBC, but probably fails SDSC, and even WDSC.

Summed Ranks (SR) is what I call the method that is used in part 2 of MDDB.

Summed Ranks (SR):

Elect the candidate over whom (summed over all the ballots) fewest 
candidates are ranked.

[end of SR definition]

MDDB is much better than SR. SR meets only FBC, qualifying  SR only as a 
substitute for Approval, if (as seems likely) Approval is rejected, and if 
the better rank methods are rejected.



But, because of its very brief and simple definition, SR should be 
considered a contingency proposal in the event that better method are 
rejected due to alleged complicatedness.

To summarize, I’d propose these rank methods in this order, going down the 
list only if methods higher in the list are not accepted:

1. SSD
2. MDDA
3. MDDB
4. PC
5. SR


Or maybe:

1. SSD
2. MDDA
3. MDDB
4. PC
5. Smith//PC
6. SR

(I’d offer Smith//PC after PC because I don’t consider it much better than 
the simpler PC, though its compliance with the Smith Criterion, and the 
other resulting criterion compliances, could make it more acceptable to 
some)

Mike Ossipoff