[EM] SFC

[Warren Smith]

>Jobst Heitzig:
Sorry, but you have overlooked the "no one falsifies a preference" 
clause: In your example, the third voter does falsify a preference.

Y
--WDS: In that case, as I said, Ossipoff's SFC definition reduces to
the requirement that the mehtod be a Condorcet method:

> "SFC: If no one falsifies a preference, and there's a CW, and a 
> majority of all the voters
> prefer the CW to candidate Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win."

I must say, SFC is then rather silly.         
It says "if no one falsifies a preference" redundantly since it also says
"a majority of all the voters prefer the CW to candidate Y"
(of course they do, that followed  from defn of CW and fact nobody falsified a preference)
and redundanty it also says "and vote sincerely" (of course they do, since
nobody falsified a preference)

It seemed to me Ossipoff probably did not intend to keep repeating himself
for no reason, so I dismissed the preface.  However, if one accepts it, then
as I said, Ossipoff's SFC definition reduces to
the requirement that the method be a Condorcet method.
One then has to ask:

1. why is he calling it SFC instead of the Condorcet criterion like everybody else since 1780?
2. why is he saying the "good" Condorcet methods obey it (all do)?
3. why is he acting as though this proves something, when in fact it is a tautology?

--Yours in mystification,
Warren D Smith