[EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[raphfrk at netscape.net]

  > Tim Hull timhull2 at gmail.com
 > Also, when I talk of
 > IRV, I'm only talking of the single-winner variant. I didn't even know
 > there WAS a multi-winner IRV as distinct from STV. I'm assuming this is
 > just STV without the transfers of surplus votes - am I right?
 
 Right, if you have PR-STV with only one seat you get IRV.
 
 > The largest such division has 19 representatives,
 > followed by 7 for the next largest, followed by a 6-seat one, a 3-seat one,
 > and several 1 and 2 seat ones. I am currently not proposing to change this
 > - I would merely use a PR system under the current setup in each
 > constituency. I MAY propose eliminating the "midterm" election, though - it
 > tends to attract low turnout as-is, and electing all seats at once would
 > increase proportionality.
 
 It would definitely be worth keeping the 19 district elected in 2 elections.
 That would mean a 10 and a 9 election. A 19 seat district would result in
 quite a large ballot if you did it all at once. 
 
 However, voters would still only have to rank 3-4 candidates. In PR-STV, 
 you get most of the value out of your vote as long as you rank 2-3 candidates 
 who end up actually getting elected. 
 
 For example, if a voter votes for a no-hoper for
 their first choice and then candidates who are likely to get elected for the 
 next 3, the voters vote might split: 
 
 First choice: 0% (didn't get elected)
 Second choice: 60%
 Third choice: 25% 
 Fourth Choice: 10%
 Exhausted: 5% wasted
 
 For the smaller districts, i.e. the 3's, 2's and 1's, it might be worth
 combining them (presumably the 1's already only have one election?). However, 
 having different rules for different districts might cause resistance. Also, if you 
 leave them in, it gives a slight advantage to the larger parties as they would 
 likely win those ones. This might help get them to support the idea.
 
 >
 > Anyway, as you can see the multi-winner case is the largest concern - and it
 > really seems like STV is the runaway winner there. As far as STV rules, I'm
 > currently thinking standard fractional-transfer STV with voters allowed as
 > many rankings as there are open seats allowed.
 
 A better rule here would be to just allow people to rank as many candidates
 as they want. Would the plan be that all the candidates are on the
 ballot and the voter just writes the number beside each candidate ? If so,
 then there is no benefit in limiting the number of ranks a voter can use.
 If a ballot gets to the end of the rankings, then it becomes exhausted. I have
 written on another thread about handling exhausted ballots, but it is a minor
 issue and there is no point in initially making the system complex (the problem
 only occurs when there are very close seats and/or lots of exhausted ballots).
 
 > Single-winner is tougher,
 > but I think I'd use IRV or Plurality there to avoid confusion concerning
 > different single-winner and multi-winner election systems.
 
 This favours the major parties. However, if they are the only 2 choices, then
 IRV is better than plurality. I would suggest approval as a simple system for 
 electing a single candidate.
 
 You could use the example of a voter approving all the candidates to show
 that allowing people vote for more than 1 candidate doesn't actually increase
 the strength of their vote.
 
 However, as you say, at least with IRV, you only have to explain 1 method.
 
 > P.S. Here is why I don't like Condorcet - it allows weak or eccentric
 > centrists to win.
 > Consider the following example: a Republican, a Democrat, and a pro
 > wrestler are running for U.S. president
 >
 > Votes are as follows
 >
 > 48% - Democrat/Pro Wrestler/Republican
 > 5% - Pro Wrestler/Democrat/Republican
 > 47% - Republican/Pro Wrestler/Democrat
 >
 > The pro wrestler beats the Democrat, 52-48, and the Republican 53-47, and
 > thus wins. Under IRV, the Democrat would have won. The only system other
 > than IRV that I know of that doesn't suffer this issue is Range/Approval...
 
 You are assuming a small number of candidates. Condorcet has the
 advantage that there is no spoiler effect, so a candidate can appear that 
 agrees with the (prior) winner on everything except one issue. This candidate 
 would then win if his opinion on that issue was preferred by the majority. This 
 should cause the candidates to cluster around the center on not just one issue. 
 
 In the above example a centerist who wasn't a pro-wrestler could also enter.
 
 The votes could then be
 
 48% - Democrat/Centerist/Pro Wrestler/Republican
 5% - Centerist/Pro Wrestler/Democrat/Republican
 47% - Republican/Centerist/Pro Wrestler/Democrat
 
 The results are then:
 
 Centerist (beats all candiates)
 beats Dem: 52-48
 beats PW: 100-0
 beats Rep: 53-47
 
 Pro Wrestler (beats all bar centerist)
 beats Dem: 52-48
 beats Rep: 53-47
 loses Cen: 0-100
 
 Democrat (only beats Republican)
 beats Rep: 53-47
 loses Cen: 48-52
 loses PW: 48-52
 
 Rep (loses to all)
 loses Dem: 47-53
 loses Cen: 47-53
 loses PW: 47-53
 
 This set of votes ofc assumes that everyone agrees that the PW shouldn't
 win to a (lawyer?) candidate but prefers him to the major parties.
    Raphfrk
 --------------------
 Interesting site
 "what if anyone could modify the laws"
 
 www.wikocracy.com 
   
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