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<div> > Tim Hull <span class="correction" id="">timhull2</span> at <span class="correction" id="">gmail</span>.<span class="correction" id="">com</span><br>
> Also, when I talk of<br>
> <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span>, I'm only talking of the single-winner variant. I didn't even know<br>
> there WAS a multi-winner <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span> as distinct from <span class="correction" id="">STV</span>. I'm assuming this is<br>
> just <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> without the transfers of surplus votes - am I right?<br>
<br>
Right, if you have PR-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span> with only one seat you get <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span>.<br>
<br>
> The largest such division has 19 representatives,<br>
> followed by 7 for the next largest, followed by a 6-seat one, a 3-seat one,<br>
> and several 1 and 2 seat ones. I am currently not proposing to change this<br>
> - I would merely use a PR system under the current setup in each<br>
> constituency. I MAY propose eliminating the "midterm" election, though - it<br>
> tends to attract low turnout as-is, and electing all seats at once would<br>
> increase proportionality.<br>
<br>
It would <span class="correction" id="">definitely</span> be worth keeping the 19 district elected in 2 elections.<br>
That would mean a 10 and a 9 election. A 19 seat district would result in<br>
quite a large ballot if you did it all at once. <br>
<br>
However, voters would still only have to rank 3-4 candidates. In PR-<span class="correction" id="">STV</span>, <br>
you get most of the value out of your vote as long as you rank 2-3 candidates <br>
who end up actually getting elected. <br>
<br>
For example, if a voter votes for a no-hoper for<br>
their first choice and then candidates who are likely to get elected for the <br>
next 3, the voters vote might split: <br>
<br>
First choice: 0% (didn't get elected)<br>
Second choice: 60%<br>
Third choice: 25% <br>
Fourth Choice: 10%<br>
Exhausted: 5% wasted<br>
<br>
For the smaller districts, i.e. the 3's, 2's and 1's, it might be worth<br>
combining them (presumably the 1's already only have one election?). However, <br>
having different rules for different districts might cause resistance. Also, if you <br>
leave them in, it gives a slight advantage to the larger parties as they would <br>
likely win those ones. This might help get them to support the idea.<br>
<br>
><br>
> Anyway, as you can see the multi-winner case is the largest concern - and it<br>
> really seems like <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> is the runaway winner there. As far as <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> rules, I'm<br>
> currently thinking standard fractional-transfer <span class="correction" id="">STV</span> with voters allowed as<br>
> many rankings as there are open seats allowed.<br>
<br>
A better rule here would be to just allow people to rank as many candidates<br>
as they want. Would the plan be that all the candidates are on the<br>
ballot and the voter just writes the number beside each candidate ? If so,<br>
then there is no benefit in limiting the number of ranks a voter can use.<br>
If a ballot gets to the end of the rankings, then it becomes exhausted. I have<br>
written on another thread about handling exhausted ballots, but it is a minor<br>
issue and there is no point in initially making the system complex (the problem<br>
only occurs when there are very close seats and/or lots of exhausted ballots).<br>
<br>
> Single-winner is tougher,<br>
> but I think I'd use <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span> or Plurality there to avoid confusion concerning<br>
> different single-winner and multi-winner election systems.<br>
<br>
This <span class="correction" id="">favours</span> the major parties. However, if they are the only 2 choices, then<br>
<span class="correction" id="">IRV</span> is better than plurality. I would suggest approval as a simple system for <br>
electing a single candidate.<br>
<br>
You could use the example of a voter approving all the candidates to show<br>
that allowing people vote for more than 1 candidate doesn't actually increase<br>
the strength of their vote.<br>
<br>
However, as you say, at least with <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span>, you only have to explain 1 method.<br>
<br>
> P.S. Here is why I don't like <span class="correction" id="">Condorcet</span> - it allows weak or eccentric<br>
> <span class="correction" id="">centrists</span> to win.<br>
> Consider the following example: a Republican, a Democrat, and a pro<br>
> wrestler are running for U.S. president<br>
><br>
> Votes are as follows<br>
><br>
> 48% - Democrat/Pro Wrestler/Republican<br>
> 5% - Pro Wrestler/Democrat/Republican<br>
> 47% - Republican/Pro Wrestler/Democrat<br>
><br>
> The pro wrestler beats the Democrat, 52-48, and the Republican 53-47, and<br>
> thus wins. Under <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span>, the Democrat would have won. The only system other<br>
> than <span class="correction" id="">IRV</span> that I know of that doesn't suffer this issue is Range/Approval...<br>
<br>
You are assuming a small number of candidates. <span class="correction" id="">Condorcet</span> has the<br>
advantage that there is no spoiler effect, so a <span class="correction" id="">candidate</span> can appear that <br>
agrees with the (prior) winner on everything except one issue. This candidate <br>
would then win if his opinion on that issue was preferred by the majority. This <br>
should cause the candidates to cluster around the center on not just one issue. <br>
<br>
In the above example a <span class="correction" id="">centerist</span> who wasn't a pro-wrestler could also enter.<br>
<br>
The votes could then be<br>
<br>
48% - Democrat/<span class="correction" id="">Centerist</span>/Pro Wrestler/Republican<br>
5% - <span class="correction" id="">Centerist</span>/Pro Wrestler/Democrat/Republican<br>
47% - Republican/<span class="correction" id="">Centerist</span>/Pro Wrestler/Democrat<br>
<br>
The results are then:<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">Centerist</span> (beats all <span class="correction" id="">candiates</span>)<br>
beats <span class="correction" id="">Dem</span>: 52-48<br>
beats <span class="correction" id="">PW</span>: 100-0<br>
beats Rep: 53-47<br>
<br>
Pro Wrestler (beats all bar <span class="correction" id="">centerist</span>)<br>
beats <span class="correction" id="">Dem</span>: 52-48<br>
beats Rep: 53-47<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">Cen</span>: 0-100<br>
<br>
Democrat (only beats Republican)<br>
beats Rep: 53-47<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">Cen</span>: 48-52<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">PW</span>: 48-52<br>
<br>
Rep (loses to all)<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">Dem</span>: 47-53<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">Cen</span>: 47-53<br>
loses <span class="correction" id="">PW</span>: 47-53<br>
<br>
This set of votes <span class="correction" id="">ofc</span> assumes that everyone agrees that the PW shouldn't<br>
win to a (lawyer?) candidate but prefers him to the major parties.<br>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div style="clear: both;"><span class="correction" id="">Raphfrk</span><br>
--------------------<br>
Interesting site<br>
"what if anyone could modify the laws"<br>
<br>
<span class="correction" id="">www</span>.<span class="correction" id="">wikocracy</span>.<span class="correction" id="">com</span></div>
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