[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

This is a good example to demonstrate how our experience with 
politics has warped and reinforced our cynicism, to the point that 
when a door is opened and there some blue sky out there, we don't 
recognize it. We think it will be the same smoke-filled room we have 
always known. Watch!

At 05:12 PM 4/20/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> > (My own thinking about this is clear: I think that my favorite
> > candidate is going to know the other candidates *much* better than I.
> > Besides, if I have an opinion, why can't I communicate that to my
> > favorite? After all, if I trust this person, presumably I would trust
> > that he or she would give my opinion a fair hearing!)
>
>I disagree:
>Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum:
>http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:2d_political_spectrum.png
>
>with 1 voter in the middle (0,0) and 3 candidates
>Candidate A is at (0, 1)
>Candidate B is at (0, -1.1)
>Candidate C is at (0.5, 1)
>
>If the voter votes for the candidate closest to them on the political
>spectrum there preference would be
>A > B > C
>
>But if A is allowed to transfer my votes he would choose the one closest
>to Them IE C.

What Swerdfeger is pointing to is nothing more than the obvious. The 
first preference of my first preference is not necessarily my second 
preference. You don't need math to see that! I'm not voting for a 
clone of myself, but for someone I trust. Two very different 
approaches. The first approach, standard operating procedure for most 
people in the present system, is to vote for someone whose position 
on the issues most closely matches my own. Swerdfeger *assumes* that 
this is optimal. I actually disagree on that very assumption.

Swerdfeger also assumes that someone the voter trust will *also* 
follow the same process: issue match.

I would much rather have someone in charge whose judgement I trust 
than someone who most closely matches my own opinions. Why? Well, if 
I were someone thoroughly conversant with all the issues, issue 
positions might be much more important to me. It's not that they are 
*un* important. But if I'm voting for a candidate because I like, for 
example, their positions on economic issues, and then comes an 
unexpected possible cause of war, I can end up being awfully unhappy 
that I went for an issue -- or even a complex of issues -- than for 
trustworthiness. Quite simply, I can't anticipate many of the issues 
that a representative will actually face. And that is what we are 
really talking about. Nobody is suggesting, here, Asset for 
single-winer officer elections.

(If it is used for officer elections, an excellent suggestion was 
made on the RV list, in the last couple of days: one votes for 
electors, not for candidates, and the electors are disqualified from 
the office for that election. This would make Asset Voting, in fact, 
usable for single-winner.)

The presumption Swerdfeger makes is that I want as my representative 
in, say, the state assembly to be the one who most closely matches my 
position on all the anticipable issues. Not only is this a problem 
with regard to unanticipated issues, but it is also a problem in two 
other major ways:

(1) It assumes that I understand the issues. Do I understand the 
issues faced by the Assembly of our state? How much time have I put 
into study of those issues, compared with people who are actually 
charged with making the decisions? Who also have staff to help them 
with the process.... I may have opinions, and even strong opinions, 
but that is not the same as being adequately informed and having had 
the opportunity to reflect on it. I would rather choose someone who, 
I trust, will *understand* my concerns and will make decisions that, 
were I to have the opportunity, I would at least consider reasonable.

(2) It makes me totally vulnerable to manipulation through standard 
political doubletalk and just plain lying. Swerdfeger thinks this 
unavoidable. But he has overlooked something, something crucial to 
understanding how Asset could *radically* change the face of politics.

>Any way, I do not trust A as far as I can throw him!
>He might be my first choice but he is still a politician.

You assume. Let me suggest this if you ever see an Asset election: 
Don't vote for a candidate you don't trust. Period. If you trust 
anyone who is willing to serve, and who might have better access to 
good information about the uther candidates, preferably face-to-face 
information and understanding, then choose that person. And if there 
is no such person, you might first wonder a little about yourself, 
perhaps you are ...  paranoid. Asset makes the field of possible 
candidates vast, unless it is combined with restrictive rules about 
who could be a candidate to receive votes. Which would essentially be 
giving us Asset with one hand and taking away its best feature with 
the other. Asset allows you to vote for anyone without wasting your vote.

Get this. Asset allows you to vote for *anyone* without wasting your 
vote. If your vote is wasted, it will be, generally, that you voted 
for someone who wasn't competent and who basically threw the vote 
away. (I have suggested that Asset candidates optionally file a vote 
assignment in advance of the election or at any time. And vote 
assignments would be considered delegable. This actually implements 
delegable proxy, and, like delegable proxy, it is simply a default, 
the assignment can be changed at any time. But those assignments 
would be public. So you would know if they were reasonable. And what 
happens with such a system is that if a candidate holding votes 
becomes unable to reassign them, for illness or whatever reason, the 
votes have a default path to follow.

If a loop is formed, it only causes harm if *all* members of the loop 
are absent, for any one of them can reassign votes which will move 
all the loop votes. I think that all members being absent would be 
highly unlikely unless the loop is very small. It gets quite unlikely 
if there are only three members. And since this would be public 
record, anyone could tell that a loop has been formed and suggest to 
the members of it that one change their assignment....

(Loops are a common objection to delegable proxy, though most people 
don't get far enough to even realize that the problem exists.... 
loops are not a problem! They are, indeed, inevitable and only cause 
harm, as above, if all members of the loop are absent. And, compared 
to present systems, which disenfranchise many or even most people, 
the temporary loss of participation by loop members under rare 
circumstances is really trivial.)

Now, I said that issues are not unimportant. Candidate positions on 
issues are part of the information I would use to decide whether or 
not I'd trust someone. If I consistently disagree with what a 
candidate has said about issues, it would be rather foolish to trust 
him or her, don't you think? I'm just pointing out something quite important:

If there were a candidate who was, somehow, supremely enlightened and 
knew exactly the best position on everything, I'm quite sure that I'd 
disagree with this person part of the time! I am *not* infallible, my 
judgement is flawed, at least on this or that.

Here is the standard I propose for choosing candidates under Asset: 
if you trust that a candidate will make as good a decision as you 
would in the situation, or better, generally, and don't know of any 
specific issues where your disagreement is strong enough to be 
important, then you can vote for the candidate.

Otherwise, you have two choices: register yourself as a candidate and 
vote for yourself. You can do that under Asset as I would see it 
implemented. You then become an elector, and you can do whatever you 
please with your vote. Of course, you will *still* face the same 
problem. You now have total freedom and control over how your vote is 
reassigned, but, in the end, unless you get elected, someone else is 
going to exercise your vote on *issues* whose opinions are not the 
same as yours. I'm not sure how much you gained!


>On the subject of lists.
>They Must be enforced if they exist.
>I am generally against them as they centralize power, but to allow
>somebody to break an election promise with no threat of recall! that is
>unconscionable!
>*NOTE : sarcasm warning above*

Hello? We run Presidential elections here based on a "list" -- with 
one candidate on it, at the top -- for electors to follow. The 
enforceability of this promise is highly questionable, it has never 
been enforced, to my knowledge. There is no opportunity for recall.

Look, if you want enforceability, fine. Let candidates specify if 
their lists are firm promises or merely statements of intention. If 
you want firm promises, vote for someone who has made firm promises. 
If you want intentions, presumably honest, but changeable at the 
discretion of the candidate, then vote for someone who has *not* made 
firm promises. Let it be explicit. Perhaps on the form, the candidate 
must check off one of two boxes: "Automatic," or "At Candidate 
Discretion." If no box is checked, it would be Automatic.

So the candidate who chooses or defaults to Automatic could not 
exercise discretion until and unless the stated preferences were exhausted.

I'm telling you, these aspects are so obvious, once one actually 
steps outside the common assumptions and starts looking anew at 
political organization, that it is embarassing to have to write all 
this. From my point of view, perhaps it is fortunate, for if others 
were also looking at the obvious and writing about it, I wouldn't 
have so much to write about.... hmmm.... I'd really rather be 
spending time with my children and grandchildren. I do *not* believe 
myself to be the brightest bulb on the block. Well, maybe the block 
.... and maybe not. There is a professor who lives next door, an 
interesting man, and we haven't had much chance to talk yet.....

> > Because Asset is really a deliberative method, it's tricky to use
> > standard election method criteria to judge it. Generally, however, it
> > would seem to satisfy *all* the major criteria. (We have to
> > amalgamate the intelligence and preferences of the voters and those
> > whom they trust in order to think this. A free proxy, which is what
> > Asset candidates become if they hold votes, it is assumed, will not
> > necessarily follow the first preference of those who voted for him or
> > her -- except for candidate list -- but may, indeed, match that
> > preference *if the voter were to become more fully informed.*)
>
>May is the optimal word. There is no reason why a "free proxy" as you
>say would follow voters preference. Even in a world where all voters and
>candidates have perfect information on everybody else position (see
>example above).

When I designate a proxy to vote for me at the annual meeting of a 
corporation, I *may* designate how the proxy will vote on certain 
issues; however, the proxy may also refuse to cast this vote. My 
remedy will not reach to change the vote. I *might* have a cause of 
action against the proxy; more likely I would not. A defense of the 
proxy would be that the proxy considered it best at the time, and the 
difference between a proxy and an absentee vote is precisely that the 
proxy can do that.

The arguments against proxy voting, I have seen in some small 
organization, is that people who are not there to witness the debate 
should not vote. Which is correct. But the proxy witnesses the 
debate. They have mistaken proxy voting for *instructed* voting, 
which is possible, but, generally, foolish. If you can't find 
somebody whom you trust and who also agrees with you on an upcoming 
issue, well, perhaps you should reconsider your position! It's not 
likely to prevail anyway!

Once again, in his response, Swerdfeger assumes that the proxy 
*should* follow the voters's preference. The proxy is casting their 
*own* vote, actually. He is *not* casting according to voter 
preferences, he or she is a free intelligent agent, chosen for 
trustworthiness. Don't trust anyone sufficiently, you have to do it 
yourself. It's kind of a law of nature. Asset actually allows you to 
do it yourself, but also allows you to do something far more 
efficient and which is reasonably likely to produce *better* results.

>As, I am slowly coming to the realization that there can be no democracy
>without a large amount of voter knowledge, not just on the candidates
>positions. But, also on the effects these policies have on the lives of
>the voters.

It's impossible. If it is necessary, then democracy is impossible. 
Most people, quite simply, don't have the time to deal with the 
increasingly complex issues of modern life. And it was already 
impossible a long time ago. But we *could* choose someone we trust, 
that is far simpler. And we can watch that person's behavior to 
decide if we continue to trust them. Delegable Proxy takes this to 
perfection and completion, but requires totally public vote 
assignments. (There are schemes for secret ballot DP, but they 
involve trusting software systems. It really just pushes the trust 
issue into another corner. Asset is simpler. Most people will vote 
secretly to create an elector class. If that class is large enough, 
then it will be difficult to corrupt.)

>I would counter your "Free proxy", with "Education reform", side
>tracking this thread even further by saying that the largest single
>holdup to the implementation of a true democracy, is the fact the
>majority of citizens do not fully (or even partially) understand how
>specific policy changes effect them.

Perhaps that's important. However, I don't think it is remediable, 
not really. Fortunately, it is not necessary to change it. And to 
understand why involves understanding the whole FA/DP plan, not just 
one aspect of it.

>One could also say that your "Free proxy" method will breed corruption
>(more so then current democracies) by encouraging voters to understand
>less about each and every candidate.

No, this is a total misunderstanding. They are putting all their eggs 
in one basket. Don't you think that they will watch that basket far 
more carefully, that they will demand far more of it? I'd expect a 
candidate who gets my vote under Asset to adequately explain 
*everything* they do! They don't have to do it personally to me, 
necessarily, but if I raise an issue, I'd expect it to be addressed. 
Fortunately, 10,000 people will not raise 10,000 issues! And a good 
candidate will anticipate difficult issues and will address them even 
without being asked.

Why in the world to I need to understand more than two candidates at 
a time? All I need to keep in mind at any time is the best for me! I 
run my own personal and continuous Condorcet election. I will from 
time to time encounter other possible candidates to vote for, and if 
I like the new one better, I'll simply move my vote to him or her 
next time. Over time, I'll fairly easily find a good match. If I'm 
sane. If I not, perhaps it is better that my influence isn't consistent!

> > retain the positive features of direct democracy without losing the
> > necessary benefits of representative democracy.)
>
>Question:
>Other than issues of scale. Are there any actual benefits to
>representative democracy?

Yes. However, they are not intrinsic or limited to to representative 
democracy of the form we know. Representative who are bound to 
represent a large number can be afforded resources not available to 
individual voters, and can likewise afford -- perhaps because they 
are salaried to do so -- to put in more personal effort to 
understanding the issues.

Asset Voting used for PR has precisely the same advantage. So does 
Delegable Proxy as it would actually be implemented. The effect is to 
concentrate representation to specialists chosen for trustworthiness. 
Averaged over many voters, I expect that this will actually choose an 
assembly which is more trustworthy, by quite a margin, than the 
average of the population. I'd retain direct *voting*, but I also 
expect that use of it would be relatively rare. Direct voting is way 
of guaranteeing to the public that the representatives can't run away 
from them. But a good assembly, I think, would very rarely see issues 
turn on direct votes. Why bother direct voting if you trust the 
person who will otherwise cast your vote? It will require you to 
become conversant with the issues, and it isn't just one vote, it is 
all the procedural motions and so forth. It's a lot of work. Sure, if 
I have a very strong opinion, I might go to the trouble. But I might 
also consider that a proxy who disagrees with me on a very important 
issue might not be the best proxy for me.... Depends.

If I find someone who I consider very trustworthy, in general, but 
they disagree with me on one issue, and I'm not about to give up on 
that one issue, perhaps I think I have special knowledge or 
understanding on that point, or for any reason, I can watch for votes 
on that issue and vote on them. If I'm an elector.

If I'm just a regular voter, I've never had the right of direct 
voting, ever, unless I lived in a Town Meeting town. And, guess what? 
My representatives are not bound to vote the way they promised when 
they were running. And they often don't. Fortunately!

Would you have campaign promises enforceable? If not, then, please, 
explain the reason why you would have vote reassignments enforceable, 
generally, rather than just when specifically made enforceable, 
voluntarily, by the candidate at registration. What's the difference 
*in the end*?