[EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22

[Howard Swerdfeger]

> (My own thinking about this is clear: I think that my favorite 
> candidate is going to know the other candidates *much* better than I. 
> Besides, if I have an opinion, why can't I communicate that to my 
> favorite? After all, if I trust this person, presumably I would trust 
> that he or she would give my opinion a fair hearing!)

I disagree:
Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:2d_political_spectrum.png

with 1 voter in the middle (0,0) and 3 candidates
Candidate A is at (0, 1)
Candidate B is at (0, -1.1)
Candidate C is at (0.5, 1)

If the voter votes for the candidate closest to them on the political 
spectrum there preference would be
A > B > C

But if A is allowed to transfer my votes he would choose the one closest 
to Them IE C.

Any way, I do not trust A as far as I can throw him!
He might be my first choice but he is still a politician.


> It's quite possible to combine the methods.
> 
> For example, it's been proposed that voters *may* on an Asset ballot, 
> specify ranked assignments for their votes. If they do so, the votes 
> will be reassigned accordingly. The Asset aspect only comes into play 
> when the ranks are exhausted. (I would assume that the vote reverts 
> to the first-preference candidate, and if there is more than one of 
> these, to the collection of them, divided.)
> 
> This hybrid method is fully STV and fully Asset. The voters 
> themselves determine how their own vote is handled. The extra cost is 
> really only the extra cost of a ranked ballot, which is small. Pure 
> Asset is easier to count.
> 
> In the other direction, candidates can publish lists of how they 
> would intend to transfer their votes. This is a method of its own, 
> called Candidate List, it's been discussed some, if the transfers are 
> automatic. If they are only a promise (as the votes of electors in 
> the U.S. Electoral College are only promises, though "faithless 
> electors" are quite rare), then it is Asset as a method, but 
> preserves flexibility. The promise can be broken if conditions appear 
> that make it advisable. I would not expect a candidate I trusted 
> would change the transfers unless there *was* a good reason, perhaps 
> some fact that surfaces that was not known when the list was published.

On the subject of lists.
They Must be enforced if they exist.
I am generally against them as they centralize power, but to allow 
somebody to break an election promise with no threat of recall! that is 
unconscionable!
*NOTE : sarcasm warning above*


> Because Asset is really a deliberative method, it's tricky to use 
> standard election method criteria to judge it. Generally, however, it 
> would seem to satisfy *all* the major criteria. (We have to 
> amalgamate the intelligence and preferences of the voters and those 
> whom they trust in order to think this. A free proxy, which is what 
> Asset candidates become if they hold votes, it is assumed, will not 
> necessarily follow the first preference of those who voted for him or 
> her -- except for candidate list -- but may, indeed, match that 
> preference *if the voter were to become more fully informed.*)

May is the optimal word. There is no reason why a "free proxy" as you 
say would follow voters preference. Even in a world where all voters and 
candidates have perfect information on everybody else position (see 
example above).

As, I am slowly coming to the realization that there can be no democracy 
without a large amount of voter knowledge, not just on the candidates 
positions. But, also on the effects these policies have on the lives of 
the voters.

I would counter your "Free proxy", with "Education reform", side 
tracking this thread even further by saying that the largest single 
holdup to the implementation of a true democracy, is the fact the 
majority of citizens do not fully (or even partially) understand how 
specific policy changes effect them.

One could also say that your "Free proxy" method will breed corruption 
(more so then current democracies) by encouraging voters to understand 
less about each and every candidate.

> retain the positive features of direct democracy without losing the 
> necessary benefits of representative democracy.)

Question:
Other than issues of scale. Are there any actual benefits to 
representative democracy?



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