[EM] RE : Re: Range voting, zero-info strategy simulation (Dave)

[Dave Ketchum]

On Wed, 1 Nov 2006 18:16:57 +0100 (CET) Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Dave,
> 
> --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> 
>>>>>D. Zero-info Approval strategy. The voter gives a 10 to every
>>>>
>>>>candidate
>>>>
>>>>>at least as good as the average value of all candidates, and gives a
>>>>>0 to the others.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Interpreting, I see, as a common case, a couple tolerable candidates,
>>>>more 
>>>>lemons, at least a few dozen voters - and thus every voter who is
>>>
>>playing
>>
>>>>this strategy approving both tolerable candidates without indicating
>>>>which 
>>>>of them is preferred as best.
>>>>
>>>>I see such strategy as a lemon, and this research as a lemon if it 
>>>>promotes such strategy as it seems to.
>>>
>>>I don't understand why you say this, Dave. If for you there are a
>>
>>couple
>>
>>>of tolerable candidates, and a bunch of bad ones, but you have no idea 
>>>which candidates are considered tolerable to the other voters, then it
>>>is indeed your best strategy to give the top score to both of the
>>>candidates you find tolerable. Although you may prefer to indicate a
>>>clear preference of one candidate over another, you must expect that
>>>Range will not reward you for doing so.
>>
>>I do not see "for you" in the text I was responding to - and will ignore 
>>it in this response.
> 
> 
> The text you were responding to is considering the strategy of a single
> voter, with the other voters' strategies and preferences being unknown.
> The single voter could be anyone.
> 
> There was no simulation or assumption that *all* voters are using any
> particular kind of strategy.
> 
IF all the other voters decide on strategies without your input, it 
matters little what single voter does, for results are not likely to be 
close enough to a tie for it to matter what single voter does.

If a significant fraction of voters vote per your promoted strategy, the 
strategy can make a difference:
      You say to NOT indicate felt preference among tolerable candidates - 
which weakens such voters influence among these candidates.
      Advice to indicate felt preferences gives these voters a chance to 
have useful influence.
> 
>>If all the voters give top score to all the tolerable candidates, then 
>>range will have no information to sort out which is best liked - BECAUSE 
>>the voters are hiding that information.
> 
> 
> You can't show a strategy to be a "lemon" by arguing that you don't 
> like the result when people use it. You have to argue that the people 
> using it would not like the result.

Nothing new here.
> 
> If it is known that the voters like the *same* candidates, then sure,
> there is a better strategy than zero-info Approval. It doesn't involve
> using all the rating positions, though.
> 
> 
>>A normal election is usually not close enough to a tie for what ONE voter
>>does to make a difference.  If, generally, the collection of voters that 
>>consider A and B tolerable vote your strategy, A and B can tie; if each 
>>who has a clear preference votes it, this should properly affect the
>>result.
> 
> 
> If these voters are strategic, then under Range the contest between A
> and B will be decided by the voters who like A but not B, or who like
> B but not A.
> 
> As you note, a single voter has hardly any ability to make a 
> difference. If he wants the best result, he doesn't want to hand out a
> 9/10 and a 10/10. He wants to rate them both in the thousands, if only
> it were allowed.

Between tens and thousands matters little, provided each voter gets the 
same treatment.
> 
> Kevin Venzke
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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