[EM] Part 2, Re: Mike: Strategy
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed May 18 20:05:15 PDT 2005
This is my last reply to James, who is someone I can't politely reply to.
So, out of consideration for the list, and because these replies aren't a
productive use of my time, I won't reply to James again on the topic of
voting systems.
This posting that I'm replying to now is so ridiculous in its repetition
that there's no need to explain why I can't politely reply to James, or to
explain why these replies are a complete waste of time.
If anyone thinks that I'm violating the conduct-guidelines, where were your
complaints when James was violating them 90 or 100 times previously?
James--
You said (last month):
The bottom line is that your definition of "undesirable results" allows
for only one 'level' of undesirability, whereas I say that there are
multiple levels, and that there are greater offenses than not electing the
sincere CW.
I reply:
If you elect a CW when there is one, then you won't elect a Condorcet loser.
If
you avoid violating Majority Wishes, then you won't elect a Pareto-dominated
candidate.
So these dire-sounding results you speak of won't happen if my standards are
met.
But you have a right to be easier to please than I am. Where I want the CW
to
win when there is one, there's nothing wrong with the fact that all you need
is
that a Condorcet loser not win. Where I want Majority Wishes to not be
viiolated, there's nothing wrong with the fact that you only care that a
Pareto-dominated candidate not be elected. Etc. You don't ask as much from a
voting system, and that is your right. To each their own.
How about a deal? I won't criticize you for your low standards if you don't
criticize me for not sharing them.
I'd said:
>
>All methods can have undesirable results. Because different methods have
different balloting rules and/or different count rules, they can have
>their undesirable results by different mechanisms, and they can have them
>in
different examples.
Right. I agree with you here, but from here we seem to go off in
different directions.
First of all: "different methods can have their undesirable results from
different mechanisms". Yes, exactly. IRV can fail to elect a sincere CW
given sincere voting, whereas Condorcet methods can fail to elect a
sincere CW because of a burying strategy. So far so good.
I reply:
Correct. Same undesirable result, though IRV has that failure automatically,
unlike wv. And in IRV the prevention of it requres favorite burial, unlike
wv.
You continued:
Second: "different methods can have them in different examples." Correct.
In Duvergian-type examples
I reply:
You mean examples in which there are two major parties due to the fact that
Plurality is in use, as described by Duverger's law?
You continue:
, IRV elects the CW with near-perfect certainty.
In examples with three or more strong candidates, IRV does not reliably
elect the CW. On the other hand, Condorcet methods, while they always
elect the CW given sincere voting, are liable to be vulnerable to strategy
(and liable to provide an undesirable result) in a wider range of
scenarios than IRV.
I reply:
I told you why wv doesn't have an offensive order-reversal problem in
situations
with only two contenders. Supporters of those 2 contenders would have no
reason
to rank anyone else but their favorite, in wv, with the result that
offensive order-reversal will backfire.
Or do you mean soimething else by "a wider range of scenarios"? Rhetorical
question, since I'm not replying to you again.
Or are you going to just limit yourself to innuendo again?
I'd said:
>That leads you to say that wv has a problem that IRV doesn't have:
vulnerability to "burying", because what you call "burying" is what can
cause
the undesirable results to happen in wv.
>I say that if the undesirable results happen, if a CW loses, or majority
>wishes
are violated, that's still the same undesirable results,
>regardless of what method did it, and regardless of what the mechanism is.
>You
call
>it a new "problem", but I call it the same undesirable result.
You continued:
I am happy to
call a new path to undesirable results a "new problem".
I reply:
Thank you for informing us of that :-) But we all had a pretty good idea
that
you're happy to say that, because you said it before, and now you repeat it
again. When you said it before, I said that I'm not interested in whether
you're
happy to call it a new problem, or how you define "new problem". I said
that I don't object to your considering
it a new problem, but I'm more interested in the undesirable results, which
are
the same; and in what it takes to cause them, which is very different in IRV
and
wv; and in what it takes to avoid them, which is very different in IRV and
wv.
You continued:
If a path to such
a result opens in scenarios where no such path had previously existed
(e.g. Duvergian scenarios), I'm happy to call this a "new problem".
I reply:
We all know by now that you're happy to say that, because you say it so
much. In fact, you've just finished telling us that you're happy to say
that. I replied
to that in the previoius paragraph. That's what I mean by repetition of
answered statements, a violation of EM conduct guidelines.
Now if I made some uncomplimentary comment, such as "Imbecile", you'd accuse
me
of violating the conduct guideliness, apparently unaware that you're
continually
violating them yourself. You say that you aren't an imbecile, but if you
weren't then you wouldn't repeat so much that statement about what you're
happy to say.
"If it quacks like a duck..."
You continued:
If the
method isn't denying election to CW's but voter strategy is, then I'm
happy to say that we have traded one problem for another (though the new
one may be less severe than the old).
I reply:
Thank you for informing us again that you're happy to say that. You've just
repeated three times in
a row that you're happy to say that. The question is: Could you be happy to
stop
saying it?
I accept the fact that you're quite incapable of understanding the stupidity
of your statement that wv is adding a new problem because it can do, by
risky offensive strategy, what IRV will often to automatically.
I'm going to repeat the answer to that statement about what you're happy to
say:
Same undesirable result. The differences? 1) In IRV, it happens
automatically,
while in wv it needs risky offensive strategy; 2) In IRV it can be prevented
only by favorite burial, while in wv it can be prevented by equal ranking,
or
deterred by truncation.
Yes, James, your happy to say that. You're very happy to say that, and you
keep
telling us that. But I've answered it every time you were happy to say it.
Could
you now be happy to stop saying it, because it's already been answered? But
feel
free to be happy to say what you think is wrong with the answers.
You continue:
You don't agree with this usage of the term "new problem"
I reply:
No, it isn't that. I don't disagree with it. I'm just tired of hearing it
over
and over again, though it makes you happy to say it.
I don't disagree with "new problem". It's just that I'm interested in what
I've
referred to as "undesirable results". All methods, including IRV and wv can
give
those undesirable results. The differences? 1) IRV will do so automatically,
while in wv they need risky offensive strategy; 2) In IRV they can be
prevented
only by favorite-burial, while in wv they can be prevented by equal-ranking,
or
deterred by truncation.
Now, I've answered that 3 times in this posting alone. Can you be happy to
stop
repeating the statment? Feel free to say what you think is wrong with my
answer.
You claim that wv does it in a wider range of conditions than IRV does,
because
IRV doesn't do it when there are only 2 contenders. I've told you why wv
doesn't
have the problem you say it does when there are only 2 contenders. I don't
have
to repeat why again, do I?
You continued:
, but you cannot
"prove" that my usage is incorrect, so there's no point in trying; your
objection is more an emotional one than a factual one.
I reply:
I've said for a long time that I have no intention of proving you're
incorrect
when you're happy to say that it's a new problem. All I said was that I
don't
care what "new problem" means to you, because I'm interested in "undesirable
results". All methods, including IRV and WV can give the same undesirable
results. The difference? 1) IRV will do so automatically, while in wv it
requires risky offensive strategy; 2) In IRV, it can be prevented only by
favorite-burial, while in wv it can be prevented by equal ranking, or
deterred
by truncation.
I don't object to your _first_ statement that you consider it a new problem.
I
object to your many many subsequent repetitions of that statement, because
there's no need to keep saying it after I've acknowledged that you believe
it.
I said that I don't challenge it because I don't care what "new problem"
means
to you. There's no factual or emotional objection to your saying that,
unless
you want to call it an emotional objection when I say that I'm tired of your
saying that you're happy to say that.
I'd said:
>
>I've told of two differences between those undesirable results in
>Plurality or IRV, and in wv:
Again, if the only kind of "undesirable result" you recognize is not
choosing from the WV-defined immune set
I reply:
I've never said anything about "Choosing from the WV-defined immune set".
That's
a term that an imbecile made up. I"ve told you why your term doesn't
make any sense.
You continued:
, then your analysis is already
biased towards WV, and Condorcet methods in general.
I reply:
So you think that if I don't want majority rule to be violated, that means
that
I'm biased. Well yes, anything that someone wants or doesn't want to happen
with
voting systems must necessarily "bias" them in favor of some methods over
others.
That's the case with Majority Wishes. I don't like a majorilty to need
drastic
giveaway stategy in order to prevent violation of its wishes. I define
Majority
Wishes in terms of a cycle, for a simple reason: What could nullilfy a
majority
pairwise preference, other than its being in a cycle of MPPs at least as
great
as it is? And judging the strength of an MPP by how big the majority is
isn't
"derived from" wv. Judging the magnitude of a majority by the number of
people
it consists of is the presumptive obvious way.
So Majoriltly rule is not derived from WV or "biased towards WV".
And not wanting people to need drastic giveaway strategy to protect the win
of a
CW isn't derived from wv or Condorcet's method either. It's the other way
around.. And Condorcet's method is advocated because, for one thing, people
are
interested in electing the CW. You say that you aren't an imbecile, but if
you weren't, then it wouldn't be necessary to explainl these things to you.
You continue:
While I agree that
the winner should come from the sincere Smith set (of which the immune set
is always a subset, or equivalent), I recognize that there are plenty of
results that can be said to be more severely undesirable than choosing an
candidate outside that set.
I reply:
The Smith Criterion is weak, and not especially important. Even Copeland
meets the Smith Criterion. Approval doesn't meet the Smith Criterion as I
define it, though it meets some other definitions of that criterion. But I
don't consider Copeland to be as good as Approval, because Copeland doesn't
even meet WDSC, much less FBC. Approval meets both of those.
You say:
Once again, that IRV is never vulnerable to the burying strategy is a
fact.
I reply:
Yes, an irrelevant fact. IRV isn't "vulnerabale to burying" because it will
give the same undesirable results without burying, and without any strategy
of any kind. IRV is "vulnerable" to its own capriciousness.
Because of that "vulnerability to strategy" stupidity, I've sometimes said
that the academics have their heads up their ass. Apparently your head too.
You continue:
I embrace [Blake's] definitions of "burying" and "compromising"
strategies because I find them to be useful. If you don't find them
useful, I suppose that's your business
I reply:
Thank yoiu. That's an improvement.
You continue:
, but you're never going to prove
them to be "wrong"
I reply:
What does it mean to prove a term wrong?? All I said was that I don't use
Blake's terms because I don't talk about what Blake talks about. Is that ok
with you?
You continue:
, or force anyone to "kiss their paradigm goodbye".
I reply:
Relax, James, no one can force you to let go of your assumptions.
You continue:
As
for the phrase "vulnerable to strategic manipulation", that's pretty
straightforward.
I reply:
Straightforwardly irrelevant. Strategy discussion based on that stupid
notion is worthless.
You say:
As I see it, you seem to overestimate the effectiveness of your own
arguments.
I reply:
Oh not at all. Argument is completely ineffective in reaching you. It's a
complete waste of time, which is why this is my last reply to you.
You continue:
Because you have "answered" some point, you tend to assume that
the point has been obliterated
I reply:
No, I assume that the point has been answered. When you've said what you
want to say about something, and I also have (having answered it), that
means that there's nothing more to say about it. It means that there's no
reason to keep repeating it. That's why we have an EM conduct-guideline that
requrests that you not repeat answered statements.
Now, if you want to say why you disagree with my answer, that's another
matter. But repetition of the answered statements violates EM
conduct-guidelines.
You continue:
, and any repetition of it is a foolishness.
I reply:
Yes.
You continue:
By this, you exclude the possibility that your argument (your "answer")
did not actually defeat the point that you believe it to have defeated.
I reply:
Wrong. Whether or not I obliterated or defeated your statement when I
answered it, the fact remains that I answered it. That means that you've
said what you wanted to say about that, and so did I. It's irresponsible to
keep repeating soimething that has been answered, something whose accuracy
has been criticized, without replying to or commenting on those answers or
accuracy-criticisms. And yet you do that all the time. You have no respect
for EM's conduct guidelines.
And as for whether I've defeated your statement with my answer: Yes, as a
matter of fact, I did. That's because I told you what was wrong with your
statement, and you never said what you think is wrong with my answer.
You continue:
Overall, you seem to repeatedly underestimate my intelligence
I reply:
On the contrary, I've been overestimating you, by taking the time to
respectfully and conscientiously reply to someone who has no respect for the
basic conduct-guidelines of this list.
You continue:
...by
re-posting things that I have already understood
I reply:
No, you haven't understood them, or you wouldn't be repeating your
statements without some comment on why you disagree with my answer.
You continue:
..., and assuming that my
arguments are defeated as soon as you reply to them.
I reply:
No, your arguments aren't defeated as soon as I reply to them. They're
defeated as soon as I reply to them and you fail to find something incorrect
in my criticism of them.
You continue:
You think that methods should minimize incentive/need
for the compromising strategy, but you ostensibly don't care what kind of
vulnerability they might have to the burying strategy.
I reply:
You call vulnerability to burying strategy a new problem, and you don't
understand the stupidity of that. (OK, I take it back: I _do_ criticize that
"new problem" statement). If you're lying on the ground with three 200 pound
weights on top of you, and someone removes two of them, you'd accuse him of
causing a new problem--the new problem being the presence of exactly one 200
pound weight.
The "new problem" that wv causes consists of the absence of IRV's automatic
undesirable results. And the ability to prevent undesirable results without
favorite-burial. If that's a new peoblem, then everyone should want that new
problem.
You continue:
This is more or
less where we began.
I reply:
You catch on fast. But that doesn't mean that you won't say it all again.
You continue:
I said that burying can be bad if it succeeds, but
you don't yet admit that a burying strategy could do anything worse than
electing someone outside the WV-defined immune set
I reply:
I've never said anything about a "WV-defined immune set". Some imbecile came
up with that term.
But electing a Pareto-dominated candidate isn't worse than violatiing
Majority Wishes, because it _is_ a violation of Majority Wishes. Likewise,
electing a Condorcet loser isn't worse than not electing the CW when there
is one, because it _is_ a failure to elect the CW when there is one.
As I said, you have much lower standards, and that's your right.
You continue:
burying strategies might be able
to give us some of those worse things, in some scenarios.
I reply:
Innuendo.
And no, your caution about replacing the status quo won't help here, because
IRV isn't the status-quo.
You said that you haven't heard the story of the Three Sillies. So I'll
repeat it:
A man hears anguished weeping and wailing coming from a tool-shed. He goes
in and find the Three Sillies crying uncontrolably. He asks them what
happened, and one of them points to a hammer hanging on the wall, and wails
that if the hammer fell, and if someone were standing by the wall when it
fell, then the hammer could hurt their toe.
You continue:
Again [and again and again...], I'm happy to call a different mechanism that
leads to the land of
bad results a "new problem", and if "bad results" are possible in
Duvergian scenarios with Condorcet while they weren't possible in
Duvergian scenarios with IRV, I'm happy to call this a "new problem".
I reply:
James, you say that you aren't an imbecile. But can you understand how it
might seem as if you are one?
And I told you why wv won't have an offensive order-reversal problem when
there are only two contenders. Then, no one has reason to rank a 2nd choice,
and so offensive order-reversal can only backfire.
Mike Ossipoff
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