[EM] Arrow's Theorem flawed?
Curt Siffert
siffert at museworld.com
Thu May 12 17:58:34 PDT 2005
I recently posted this addendum to the Arrow's Theorem page on
wikipedia: It was immediately deleted for "bias".
"The theorem is criticized by many vote theorists, however, for
depending on flawed requirements. [...] It is the final (IIAC)
criterion that is most controversial. Some vote theorists believe there
are scenarios of voting behavior where "failing" the IIAC is considered
rational behavior by a voting society. One such example is where one
candidate's supporters are far more loyal than another's, and the
introduction of a third candidate would split the support of the third
candidate. If failing IIAC is not always a "flaw", then the voting
methods that fail only this criterion would not necessarily be
considered flawed. In other words, some vote theorists believe Arrow's
theorem improperly asserts that passing the IIAC is a requirement to be
considered a satisfactory voting method. This would render follow-up
theorems, such as the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, flawed as well."
Was I out in left field for writing this? I was under the impression
that many vote theorists agreed with this characterization. It seems
to me that Arrow's theorem has a hidden assumption that every voter
feels equally represented by their choice when they cast their ballot,
which is a pretty silly assumption to make about an electorate. If
they don't feel equally jazzed about their choices, then failing IIAC
could sometimes be desired behavior.
My favored example:
40 A
60 C
C wins. Introduce B, and:
40 A B C
35 B C A
25 C A B
If A's supporters felt dead-set on A, and C's supporters largely felt
they were compromising and didn't object to A all that much, then this
breakdown could make sense. Almost all common voting systems
(including most Condorcet tie-breakers) pick A as the winner. It's
pretty hard to make the case that that is a bad thing. Arrow's theorem
declares that any voting method that picks A is by definition a flawed
method.
Curt
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