[EM] "Approval Later-no-Harm", (was "AWP versus DMC and AM")
Chris Benham
cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Fri May 6 10:44:31 PDT 2005
Ted, James (and anyone interested),
In my last post (Thu.May5) I suggested this
criterion:
"If x wins, and afterwards some identical ballots
that approve x are uniformly changed only so that they
approve more candidates than previously; then if there
is a new winner it must be one of the candidates
approved on these altered ballots."
This is supposed to be a simple test for the property
that approving more candidates should never change the
winner from an approved (on the original ballots)
candidateto a disapproved (on both sets of ballots)
candidate.
This is very similar to this monotonicity-like
criterion:
"If x wins, and afterwards some ballots are changed
only to increase the approval scores of some other
candidates; then if there is new winner it must be one
of the candidates whose approval scores have been
raised."
Or maybe it is better to put it the other way:
"If x wins, and afterwards some ballots are changed
only to decrease the approval scores of one or more
other candidates; then x must still win."
Yes, this seems more succinct. But what to call it,
"Mono-reduce opposition approval"?
Another criterion that applies to rankings/approval
methods interests me, which I might call "Disapproval
Later-no-Harm":
"Ranking a disapproved candidate must never harm an
approved candidate".
(A stronger version would add "or a higher-ranked
disapproved candidate").
This is incompatible with Condorcet, and in a future
post I'll suggest a method that meets it.
Chris Benham
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