[EM] James: Part II, strategy terms

[James Green-Armytage]

Hi Mike,
	Replies follow on the subject of strategy terms...
>
>
>Apparently we aren't interested in the same distinctions, that's all.
>
>By the way, I often use the word "bury" or "burial", meaning to vote a 
>candidate lower than you would if you voted your preferences and didn't 
>falsify any preferences. I use that term in that way when I speak of 
>favorite-burial. You want to give a different meaning to "bury", a
>meaning 
>not supported by the usual meaning of that word. Fine. But you've got to 
>distinguish between how you like to define things and how others should 
>define things.

	Blake has defined the "burying strategy", in the context of voting
strategy, in a particular way. I have produced a slightly modified version
of his definition, but I think that his basic concept is what's important,
rather than my slight tinkering with it. Others beside myself have made
use of his terms. "Burying" means one thing in the context of funereal
services. In the context of voting strategy, it has been given a
definition by Blake, and I (and others) find that definition quite useful.
>
I wrote:
>Your strategic analysis centers on what strategy voters should use to
>promote the election of the candidate whom they regard to be the sincere
>CW.
>
you replied:
>No, in regards to my criteria and strategy definitions, I'm not
>interested 
>in what strategy voters should use. I'm interested in what strategies
>they 
>should need in order to protect the win of a CW, or to protect majorilty 
>rule.

	That sounds like pretty much the same thing to me.
>
>Excuse me, James. Give me a grounding in the basics :-)

	Read Blake's EMR page at Condorcet.org. I don't subscribe to all of his
definitions, and I don't agree with him on all controversial issues (e.g.
margins vs. wv), but I think that some of his terms (e.g. burying,
compromising, push-over, crowding) form a useful basis for understanding
strategic possibilities in different methods.
>
>I assume that next you're going to tell me where you believe that I go
>wrong 
>in terms of the basics.
>
>You continue:
>
>, and perhaps to start from a place that doesn't
>presuppose the normativeness of a particular algorithm.
>
>I reply:
>
>????
>
>Well, give me a grounding in this basic: I have no idea what "normative" 
>means. It isn't that I haven't loooked it up. But the definition that I
>find 
>when I look up "normative" is one that couldn't be consistent with its
>use 
>in voting system discussion. I've begun to accept the fact that
>"normative" 
>is intranslatable, rather like the German word "gar"

	"Normative" often stands in contrast to "positive". A positive judgement
is a judgement about how things are, while a normative judgement is a
judgement about how things should be... specifically what rules and
organizational systems should be used. In this context, I meant to say
that by incorporating the concept of the CW into your strategy criteria,
you are already assuming that Condorcet methods are normative, i.e. that
they should be used. I happen to agree that they should be used, but I
think that basic strategy terms should be established independently from
this conclusion.
>
>Oh, ok, so that's what it means to pre-suppose the normativeness of a 
>particualr algorithm: "definiltions that seem to be somewhat loaded,
>rather 
>than starting somewhere a bit more flexible."
>
>Thanks for the precise clarification of what you meant.

	Your definitions are loaded. That is, obviously designed to support
methods that you have already decided to advocate. When you had your
"technical evaluation of election methods" page on electionmethods.org,
you made no mention of the fact that IRV passes
later-no-help/later-no-harm and is therefore immune to the burying
strategy, because you had already decided that you didn't want to promote
IRV.
>
>I don't claim to be able to tell you what compromising-compression means, 

	That's too bad, since I gave you the date of the posting where I defined
it. That's 3/29/04. But anyway, here's the direct link:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-March/012515.html
	In that post (one year ago tomorrow) I discussed the difference between
your criteria and Blake's criteria in some depth. Hence, it's closely
related to our current discussion, and I request that you read it.
>
>As I said in the message to which you're replying, your definitions make 
>reference to the intentiions, beliefs and hopes of the voters using the 
>strategy. Maybe that would be a good thing for you to keep in mind.

	Yes, it is.
>
>There's nothing wrong with telling what you think. But you forgot to tell 
>why you think it.
>Basically, you're saying that it would be helpful to work from your 
>definitions. 

	I think of them more as Blake's terms than mine. My definitions are only
a slightly modified version of his definitions, and I'm open to the
possibility that his wordings are more useful.

>From your point of view, I don't doubt that that is so, but you 
>haven't told why it's so in a more general sense.
>
	I was exposed to your definitions before Blake's definitions. Your
definitions left me quite confused about strategic possibilities in
different methods. When I expressed some of my confusion, Markus told me
Blake's terms, and I feel that it cleared up a lot. Especially Blake's
list of which methods are vulnerable to which strategies.
	I've told you that Blake's definitions are less loaded than yours. Hence
they are a more acceptable starting point for people who aren't
necessarily convinced that all voting methods should be judged against the
standard of Condorcet (wv) and approval voting. His definitions are also
simpler than yours. Again, this doesn't make yours invalid. It just makes
me feel that his concepts are a more reasonable starting point, while your
concepts are better for later study, built on the previously-established
foundations.

Sincerely,
James