[EM] Approval strategy from rankings
stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Mon Jan 5 12:36:03 PST 2004
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
> (David Gamble I think) continued:
> Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
> orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
> two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would give
> results identical to Borda.
> Sincere rankings:
> 50: ABCD
> 50: DCBA
> 50: BCDA
> Approval votes inferred as described above:
> 50: ABC
> 50: DC
> 50: B
I disagree. Approval votes inferred as described above:
Approval winner: B
Borda scores (x50/3):
Borda winner: B
> Winners: B & C
> Borda scores:
> A: 3
> B: 6
> C: 5
> B is the unique winner.
> It isn't guaranteed to match Borda, because it depends on which 1/3 of the
> voters you have voting for which number of candidates. You can get different
> results by assigning different roles to the different thirds of the voters.
Did I misunderstood?
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