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<p>MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>(David Gamble I think) continued:
<p>Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
<br>orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
<br>two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
<br>results identical to Borda.
<p>Sincere rankings:
<p>50: ABCD
<br>50: DCBA
<br>50: BCDA
<p>Approval votes inferred as described above:
<p>50: ABC
<br>50: DC
<br>50: B</blockquote>
I disagree. Approval votes inferred as described above:
<br>50/3: ABC
<br>50/3: AB
<br>50/3: A
<br>50/3: DCB
<br>50/3: DC
<br>50/3: D
<br>50/3: BCD
<br>50/3: BC
<br>50/3: B
<p>Approval winner: B
<br>Borda scores (x50/3):
<br>A: 3
<br>B: 6
<br>C: 5
<br>D: 4
<br>Borda winner: B
<blockquote TYPE=CITE>
<pre>Winners: B & C
Borda scores:
A: 3
B: 6
C: 5
B is the unique winner.
It isn't guaranteed to match Borda, because it depends on which 1/3 of the
voters you have voting for which number of candidates. You can get different
results by assigning different roles to the different thirds of the voters.</pre>
</blockquote>
Did I misunderstood?
<p>Steph.
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