[EM] Re: (Better) Smith Majority Approval
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Thu Jan 15 06:41:41 PST 2004
On Th.Jan.15, 2004 you posted:
"Balloting: Rank-Balloting, with Approval cutoff.
Truncation & equal-ranking allowed.
1. Drop from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.
2. If more than 1 remains, drop from the rankings every candidate who has a
majority defeat that isn't in a cycle of majority defeats, unless that would
delete all the remaining candidates.
3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the
most voters' Approval cutoffs.
[end of Smith Majority Approval definition]"
This seems very similar to "Approval Completed Condorcet" (ACC) which is discussed
in these 2002 postings by Adam Tarr:
Is Smith Majority Approval (SMA) better in terms of "defensive strategy properties" than ACC?
Is SMA better than Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination?
And if so, why?
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