[EM] Re: (Better) Smith Majority Approval

[Chris Benham]

Mike,
On Th.Jan.15, 2004  you posted:

"Balloting: Rank-Balloting, with Approval cutoff.

Truncation & equal-ranking allowed.

1. Drop from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.

2. If more than 1 remains, drop from the rankings every candidate who has a 
majority defeat that isn't in a cycle of majority defeats, unless that would 
delete all the remaining candidates.

3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the 
most voters' Approval cutoffs.

[end of Smith Majority Approval definition]"

This seems very similar to "Approval Completed Condorcet" (ACC) which is discussed 
in these 2002 postings by Adam Tarr:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9133

 <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html>http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html

Is Smith Majority Approval (SMA) better in terms of "defensive strategy properties" than ACC?
Is SMA better than Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination?

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010198.html

And if so, why?

Chris Benham



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