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Mike,<br>

On Th.Jan.15, 2004  you posted:<br>

<pre>"Balloting: Rank-Balloting, with Approval cutoff.

Truncation & equal-ranking allowed.

1. Drop from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.

2. If more than 1 remains, drop from the rankings every candidate who has a 

majority defeat that isn't in a cycle of majority defeats, unless that would 

delete all the remaining candidates.

3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the 

most voters' Approval cutoffs.

[end of Smith Majority Approval definition]"

This seems very similar to "Approval Completed Condorcet" (ACC) which is discussed 

in these 2002 postings by Adam Tarr:

<a

 href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html">http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9133

</a><a

 href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2002-April/008013.html</a>

Is Smith Majority Approval (SMA) better in terms of "defensive strategy properties" than ACC?

Is SMA better than Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination?

<a

 href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010198.html">

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010198.html</a>

And if so, why?

Chris Benham

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