[EM] Smith Majority Approval
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Jan 14 22:56:04 PST 2004
Balloting: Rank-balloting with Approval cutoff. Truncation & equal ranking
(though they're unlikely to be needed)
1. Delete from the rankings every candidate who isn't in the Smith set.
2. If more than 1 remain, delete from the rankings every candidate who has a
unless all remaining do.
3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the
most people's Approval
[end of Smith Majority Approval defilnition]
As with any of the best methods, this method could have the tie-drop-line
option, by which the voter could indicate that, if there's a circular tie
whose every member has a majority defeat, and which has members above &
below that voter's tie-drop-line, that voter wants to delete from his
ranking every candidate below that line. That option is no more needed with
this method than with wv, NES, or DSV, but could be useful with any good
method if order-reversal were regarded as a problem.
Likewise, the other anti-order-reverrsal enhancements that I've described
could be useful with any good method, including this one, if order-reversal
were considered a problem.
The above definition is for public elections. For committees, organizations,
meetings, and polls, using the Schwartz set instead of the Smith set would
be a refinement, provided that the participants accept its slightly wordier
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