[EM] Truncation

[Bart Ingles]

Adam Tarr wrote:
> 
> Bart Ingles wrote:
> 
> > In effect, the two sides combine as a "pool" of votes, and don't
> > know
> > which side they are on until after the election.  In fact by
> > truncating
> > they are voting for an AC lottery over a probable B win.
> 
> This amounts to voter collusion, and is theoretically possible.  Given
> the right candidate utilities, this is indeed the prisoner's dilemma,
> but as we well know the prisoner's dilemma usually ends with both
> criminals picking the Nash equilibrium and ratting out their pal.  In
> the same way, both factions would have every reason to betray their
> collusive rival and vote sincerely once they got into the voting
> booth.  After all, voting their full preferences could only help them,
> just as the truncation of their opposing faction can only help them.

Collusion is a fair enough term.  Yes, I acknowledge that A's victories
come solely from C's truncation and vice-versa, but the two sides don't
know which is which in advance of the election.  In effect the voter
accepts a stronger defeat when he loses, in expectation of a stronger
victory when he wins.  I was evidently wrong in thinking that there was
no prisoner's dilemma involved, but whether both sides participate
likely depends on the payoff, which in turn depends heavily on what they
think of candidate B.

Bart

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