[EM] Truncation

[Forest Simmons]

On Wed, 18 Sep 2002, Adam Tarr wrote in part:

> [Bart wrote in part]
> >  But then I don't see truncation as necessarily a bad thing. If
> > truncation can defeat a "hated middle" candidate, it addresses my main
> > misgiving about the Condorcet methods.
>
> Much in the same way that we can't differentiate between the indifferent
> voter and the lazy voter, we cannot distinguish between the "respected (if
> unglamorous) compromise middle" and the "hated (yet still) compromise
> middle".  Smart CBA voters in an approval election will still approve B, to
> defeat A, anyway.  What method would actually prevent B from winning when
> the voters act in a logical manner?  Even plurality and IRV encourage CBA
> voters to dump C for B if they have perfect information.
>

Relative to the "hated compromise."

In a zero information election Approval would give a better result.

In a perfect information election Approval would pick the CW.

So in a partial information election (somewhere in between the above two
cases) why would we expect Condorcet to give a result so superior as to
justify the added complexity of the method?

Forest

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